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migration problem has been “securitized” and the migrants coming to Europe 
from the countries such as Iraq or Syria are often viewed with suspicion, if not 
with open enmity. This feeling is further bolstered by the news in the mainstre-
am media about the crimes that the migrants have committed in Western Eu-
rope and their links to terrorist organizations. Again it has to be kept in mind 
that out of the tens of thousands of refugees, those guilty of crimes or suppor-
ters of terrorism and organizations like Islamic State form a definite minority, 
their image has grown to a disproportionate size in the public discourse. In ad-
dition, the Czech Muslim community is still comparatively extremely small, 
especially given the fact that the Czech Republic is not a desired country of de-
stination.97 As mentioned earlier in the text, working with fear and anxiety is 
the easiest (although only temporarily successful) tactic for gaining public sup-
port and seems to have been working quite well so far in the Czech Republic. 
This then leads to the final conclusion or suggestion. It has been discussed
in Chapter III how migration, coupled with terrorism and with (so far mo-
stly verbal) attacks on Islam and Muslims have become an important of the 
discourse on the political level and how certain individuals, or even parties, 
are trying to use this to gain advantage in the upcoming elections. While this 
is definitely worrying, it has to be kept in mind that: a) this phenomenon is 
not unique to the Czech Republic – in fact, it is possible to witness the surge
of populist political parties in a number of countries including France, Germa-
ny, the UK, Netherlands or even Finland and Sweden. While the opinion polls 
in the Czech Republic do not seem to give much chance to the populist parties 
of becoming a decisive or even important factor after the upcoming elections, 
in other countries they are coming much closer; b) the migration wave has ap-
parently already reached its peak (at least for the time being) and has been rece-
ding. It could be expected that the interest of the public, and consequently the 
public support for the populists, will recede as well; c) as for the Czech political 
scene in general (as discussed above), some of the mainstream politicians have 
picked up on the issue of migration as well, but this could be seen as a reaction 
to the developments and the attempt to “steal back” votes from the populists. 
Once this becomes useless, it is likely that the migration issue will be accredited 
much less importance in the mainstream political discourse.
97 On the “danger” that the Czech Muslim community currently poses and on the way this is presented 
in the media, see e.g. “Čeští muslimové respektují zákony, radikálům se brání sami, ujišťuje BIS. Terror
u nás prý nehrozí”, idnes.cz, 9 January 2017, https://zpravy.aktualne.cz/domaci/cesti-muslimove-nechteji-
vyvolavat-strety-nebo-provokovat-zn/r~8e89bdaed67b11e694810025900fea04/?redirected=1487237890
[accessed: 14.01.2017]; “Anatomie českých muslimů. Fascinující a mimořádně pestrý svět”, lidovky.cz,
11 February 2017, http://www.lidovky.cz/anatomie-ceskych-muslimu-fascinujici-a-mimoradne-pestry-
svet-pub-/zpravy-domov.aspx?c=A170211_115705_ln_domov_ele [accessed: 15.02.2017]. 
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2.1. Introduction 
(Dániel Horváth, Hanga Horváth-Sántha)
Hungary demonstrates a relatively high level of ethnic and particularly high 
level of cultural homogeneity. Nevertheless, due to its geographical position, 
Hungary has played the role both as transit and source as well as destination 
country for both regular and irregular migration during the past decades. In the 
context of the recent large-scale irregular migration towards (Western) Europe, 
however, Hungary has rather been a transit country, experiencing serious pres-
sure at its southern border urging the government to take firm action. As mem-
ber of the European Union since 2004 and of the Schengen Treaty since 2007, 
a part of Hungary’s border forms the external borders of the European Union.
Understanding Hungary’s reaction and firm standpoint in relation to the 
large-scale influx of irregular migrants to the European continent needs a brief 
overview over the past couple of centuries of Hungarian history. From 1526 the 
Kingdom of Hungary suffered for nearly 160 years under the Ottoman Empi-
re, splitting the country into three parts and opposing systems with devastating 
consequences for the Hungarian nation including a demographic catastrophe 
(with the population loss in some regions reaching 70 and 90%).1 Soon after 
the Ottoman conquest Hungary was incorporated into the Austro-Hungarian 
Monarchy after a freedom revolution crushed by Austrian and Russian tro-
ops in 1849. The 20th century brought even worse political traumas still vivid 
in the national remembrance of the nation: forced into the World War I as 
part of the Austrian Empire, Hungary lost 72% of its land through the Treaty 
of Trianon in 1920, including e.g. 3.7 million ethnic Hungarians, 62% of its rail 
lines, 85% of its forests, 50% of its arable land, 100% of its salt and steel mines.2 
Neither did the second part of the 20th century bring prosperity to the Hun-
garian people: after World War II the country was invaded by the Soviet Red 
Army troops assuring that a Communist-dominated government was installed 
for the post-war period. The Soviet troops remained in the country with re-
1 P. Fodor, “Hungary between East and West: The Ottoman Turkish Legacy”, [in:] More Modoque. 
Die Wurzeln der europäischen Kultur und deren Rezeption im Orient und Okzident: Festschrift für Miklós 
Maróth zum siebzigsten Geburtstag. Argumentum Kiadó, MTA Bölcsészettudományi Kutatóközpont, 
Budapest 2013, pp. 406–407.
2 E. Ludwig, “Trianoni veszteségeink”, Magyar Nemzet Online, 2010, available at: http://mno.hu/
migr_1834/trianoni_vesztesegeink-239085 [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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ference to the so called mutual assistance treaty by the two countries’ govern-
ments, eventually resulting in the revolution of October 1956 crushed by the 
Soviets, killing thousands of civilians. After 1989 (and 1991, as the last Soviet 
tank left the country) Hungary tried to re-build its national community as 
“a homogenous, culturally rich and dynamic society, with limited resources, 
but with definitive democratic and modern values”.3
The migrant crisis of 2015 was not the first time Hungary experienced lar-
ge-scale migration. The first significant influx of refugees was during the 1980’s 
when tens of thousands of ethnic Hungarians fled the dictatorship and ethnic 
discrimination in neighbouring Romania as well as from former Yugoslavia 
when the civil war broke out. Hungary acceded to the 1951 Geneva Conven-
tion and the 1967 Protocol relating to the Status of Refugees in March 1989,4 
the primary reason was to be able to clarify the legal situation of the ethnic 
Hungarians fleeing from the neighbouring countries, but during the coming 
decade Hungary also commenced to grant protection as refugees to persons 
originating from non-European states.5 Current statistics show that asylum se-
ekers arrive to Hungary from a variety of source countries: during 2016 the 
top five countries of origin where Afghanistan, Syria, Pakistan, Iraq and Iran 
(Table 2.1 below). The persons from Afghanistan represented a third of all asy-
lum seekers in Hungary (Table 2.1 below), doubling the number of Syrians and 
tripling the number of Iraqis, who in the overall European Union average re-
mained the largest and the third largest categories of all asylum seekers.6
Due to its location on the so called Western Balkan migrant route (via Tur-
key, Greece, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Serbia or Croatia 
to then via Hungary to other EU Member States) Hungary, as traditionally 
a transit country, was heavily exposed to the large-scale influx of irregular mi-
grants during the migrant crisis in the second part of 2015. The route had in-
creased in popularity in the previous years as visa restrictions for five countries 
on the Balkans was relaxed in 2012 (Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Mon-
tenegro, Serbia and the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia), but the re-
cord number of migrants arriving to the Greek islands in 2015 had a dramatic 
effect on the Western Balkan route with unprecedented numbers attempting to 
re-enter the European Union through Hungary.7
3 A. Belhaj, “Hungary and Migratory Fracture”, Migration Research Institute, 2016, available at: http://
www.migraciokutato.hu/en/2016/10/24/hungary-and-the-migratory-fracture/ [accessed: 25.02.2017].
4 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, “Background Information on the Situation in the 
Republic of Hungary in the Context of the Return of Asylum Seekers”, 31 December 1999, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b33a14.html [accessed: 27.02.2017].
5 G. Demény, “Integration of Refugees in Hungary”, 2007, Fundamentum, 2008, 12. évf. 5, p. 116, 
availabe at: http://www.fundamentum.hu/sites/default/files/08-e-11.pdf [accessed: 25.02.2017]. 
6 EASO, “Latest Asylum Trends – 2016 Overview”, pp. 1–2, available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/
sites/default/files/Latest%20Asylum%20Trends%20Overview%202016%20final.pdf [accessed: 25.02.2017].
7 Frontex, “Western Balkan Route”, 2017, available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/
western-balkan-route/ [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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4 UN High Commissioner for Refugees, UNHCR, “Background Information on the Situation in the 
Republic of Hungary in the Context of the Return of Asylum Seekers”, 31 December 1999, available at: 
http://www.refworld.org/docid/3ae6b33a14.html [accessed: 27.02.2017].
5 G. Demény, “Integration of Refugees in Hungary”, 2007, Fundamentum, 2008, 12. évf. 5, p. 116, 
availabe at: http://www.fundamentum.hu/sites/default/files/08-e-11.pdf [accessed: 25.02.2017]. 
6 EASO, “Latest Asylum Trends – 2016 Overview”, pp. 1–2, available at: https://www.easo.europa.eu/
sites/default/files/Latest%20Asylum%20Trends%20Overview%202016%20final.pdf [accessed: 25.02.2017].
7 Frontex, “Western Balkan Route”, 2017, available at: http://frontex.europa.eu/trends-and-routes/
western-balkan-route/ [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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Table 2.1
The Number of Asylum Application by Nationality  
in Hungary 2016
Citizenship 2016
Afghan 11,052
Syrian 4,979
Pakistani 3,873
Iraqi 3,452
Iranian 1,286
Moroccan 1,033
Algerian 710
Turkish 425
Somali 331
Bangladeshi 279
Kosovar 135
Other 1,877
Total 29,432
Source: Hungarian Immigration and Asylum Office, 
Issue 2015–2016 Annual Statistics, available at: http://
www.bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=it
em&layout=item&id=492&Itemid=1259&lang=en# 
[accessed: 25.02.2017].
Figure 2.1
The Western Balkan Route
Source: Frontex and the Center for Eastern Stud-
ies (OSW), available at: https://www.osw.waw.pl/en/
publikacje/analyses/2015-07-01/migration-pressure-
hungarian-border [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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During the period between January and August 2015 more than 400,000 
persons entered the country illegally of which 132,006 applied for asylum. 
There is no official data available on the exact number of irregular migrants 
arriving, but according to estimations by the International Organization for 
Migration (IOM) the number of illegal border crossings attempted or comple-
ted in Hungary in 2015 was close to 411,515.8 According to the figures from 
IOM Hungary was on the third place (after Greece and Croatia) regarding the 
apprehended number of irregular migrants at its external borders.9 Approxima-
tions made by the Hungarian authorities suggest that the number of irregular 
migrants is in fact much higher and rather closer to 460,000; however, no offi-
cial data confirms this figure. During these weeks it became clear to the Hun-
garian authorities that the tools and mechanisms for border control provided 
by the Schengen system were purely sufficient for smaller groups of persons en-
tering the county, and as other countries on the Western Balkan route had pro-
ved incapable of performing the duty to register the potential asylum seekers, 
a large administrative burden fell on the Hungarian authorities.10 The Hun-
garian government awaited a joint response form the leaders of the European 
Union to act upon the crisis, but eventually started the construction of a barrier 
(barbed-wire fence) in June 2015 on the Serbian and Croatian borders with the 
priority to protect its nationals, as well as to maintain public order and security 
and to combat irregular migration. The fence had an immediate impact on the 
number of irregular migrants arriving to the country, decreasing the numbers 
dramatically, which at the highest point were moving around 7,000 persons 
a day.11 The strengthening of the border was complemented through amend-
ments to the asylum law designating Serbia as safe third country and allowing 
for expedited asylum determination.12 In addition, climbing through the fence 
or damaging it became criminal offence punishable with imprisonment thro-
ugh an amendment to the Penal Code.13 There is no current data available on 
the number of persons sentenced according to the new amendment, but an ar-
ticle from the Hungarian news website Index dated February 2016 – referring 
8 IOM, “Migration Issues in Hungary”, 2016, available at: http://www.iom.hu/migration-issues-hun 
gary [accessed: 25.02.2017].
9 Ibidem.
10 A Magyar Tudományos Akadémia Migrációs Munkacsoportja (The Migration Working Group 
of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences), MTA MM, “Az Európába irányuló, és 2015-től felgyorsult 
migráció tényezői, irányai és kilátásai”, 2015, p. 5, available at: http://mta.hu/data/cikkek/106/1060/
cikk-106072/_europabairanyulo.pdf [accessed: 25.02.2017].
11 IOM, “Migration Issues in Hungary”...
12 Ibidem.
13 352/B. § in the Hungarian Penal Code, entered into force on 15 September 2015 through law 
2015. évi CXL. törvény 31. §.
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to statistics from the City Courthouse of Szeged (located approximately 20 km 
from the Serbian border) – mentioned 1,052 persons found guilty of the cri-
mes above.14
Table 2.2
Average Daily Number of Irregular Migrants in Hungary 
during the Migrant Crisis in 2015
May 274
June, July and August 1,500 447%
September and October >7,000 366%
November and December 10
Source: IOM and Hungarian Police. Table made by the Migration 
Research Institute, available at: http://www.iom.hu/migration-issues-
hungary; http://www.police.hu/hirek-es-informaciok/hatarinfo/elfogott-
migransok-szama-lekerdezes?honap%5Bvalue%5D%5Byear%5D=20
15&honap%5Bvalue%5D%5Bmonth%5D=9 [accessed 25.02.2017].
Through a brief overlook over Hungary’s history of immigration from the 
1980’s and onwards it becomes clear that immigration towards the country has 
mainly been dominated by persons originating from the neighbouring coun-
tries Romania, Ukraine, Yugoslavia and Slovakia (Figure 2.2 below). Between 
the years of 1988 and 2002 the number of immigrants arriving to the country 
was 295,000 of which 71% from the neighbouring countries.15 It is important 
to bear in mind this seemingly high figure, as it makes immigration to Hun-
gary rather unique in a sense that most of the persons originating from these 
countries (90%) were of Hungarian origin.16 The most common motivational 
factor behind the migration to Hungary was the ethnic discrimination both 
by the states as well as by the members of the majority societies, further eth-
nic tensions and everyday conflicts, making life as an ethnic minority insecure. 
Hungary – as stated in its Fundamental Law17 – bears responsibility for the fate 
of Hungarians living beyond its borders. Originating from territories that once 
were integral parts of Hungary the sameness in language, culture and history 
self-evidently facilitated their social inclusion. 
14 See http://index.hu/belfold/2016/02/08/atlepte_az_ezret_a_keritesmaszasert_elitelt_migransok_
szama/ [accessed: 25.02.2017].
15 Demographic Yearbooks of Hungary referred to by I. Gödri, [in:] The Nature and Causes of Im- 
migration into Hungary and the Integration of the Immigrants into Hungarian Society and Labour Mar- 
ket. Demografia English Edition, Vol. 49, Budapest 2005, p. 168, available at: http://demografia.hu/en/
publicationsonline/index.php/demografiaenglishedition/article/view/259/589 [accessed: 25.02.2017].
16 Ibidem.
17 See The Fundamental Law of Hungary, Article D; http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/
The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20of%20Hungary.pdf [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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Additionally, Hungary has also received a fairly huge number of immigrants 
coming both from the EU as well as from non-EU countries and from Asia 
(especially from Vietnam and China), but the number of persons originating 
from the American or the African continents have never been greater than 
a couple of hundred persons.18
Figure 2.2
Immigration to Hungary between 1988 and 2002
Source: Demographic Yearbooks of Hungary referred to by I. Gödri, [in:] The Nature and 
Causes of Immigration into Hungary and the Integration of the Immigrants into Hungarian 
Society and Labour Market. Demografia English Edition, Vol. 49, Budapest 2005, p. 169, 
available at: http://demografia.hu/en/publicationsonline/index.php/demografiaenglishedi 
tion/article/view/259/589 [accessed: 25.02.2017].
The main countries of origin regarding migration to Hungary of today are 
– as indicated in Table 2.1 above – non-EU countries mostly located in the 
Middle East and South-East Asia. During 2015 no less than 177,135 per-
sons applied for asylum in Hungary (which was an increase with 314 per cent 
compared to 2014), with the number of the non-European asylum seekers in-
creasing with 626 per cent (compared to 2014).19 More than 150,000 of the 
applications were terminated by the Hungarian Immigration and Asylum Of-
fice as the asylum seekers left the country.20 The number of asylum seekers 
18 Ibidem.
19 Statistics for 2015 from the Hungarian Immigration and Asylum Office, available at: http://www.
bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=177&Itemid=1232&lang=hu 
[accessed: 3.03.2017].
20 Ibidem.
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Additionally, Hungary has also received a fairly huge number of immigrants 
coming both from the EU as well as from non-EU countries and from Asia 
(especially from Vietnam and China), but the number of persons originating 
from the American or the African continents have never been greater than 
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Immigration to Hungary between 1988 and 2002
Source: Demographic Yearbooks of Hungary referred to by I. Gödri, [in:] The Nature and 
Causes of Immigration into Hungary and the Integration of the Immigrants into Hungarian 
Society and Labour Market. Demografia English Edition, Vol. 49, Budapest 2005, p. 169, 
available at: http://demografia.hu/en/publicationsonline/index.php/demografiaenglishedi 
tion/article/view/259/589 [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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– as indicated in Table 2.1 above – non-EU countries mostly located in the 
Middle East and South-East Asia. During 2015 no less than 177,135 per-
sons applied for asylum in Hungary (which was an increase with 314 per cent 
compared to 2014), with the number of the non-European asylum seekers in-
creasing with 626 per cent (compared to 2014).19 More than 150,000 of the 
applications were terminated by the Hungarian Immigration and Asylum Of-
fice as the asylum seekers left the country.20 The number of asylum seekers 
18 Ibidem.
19 Statistics for 2015 from the Hungarian Immigration and Asylum Office, available at: http://www.
bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=177&Itemid=1232&lang=hu 
[accessed: 3.03.2017].
20 Ibidem.
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decreased significantly in 2016 with 29,432 persons applying for asylum 
in Hungary.21 The recognition rate of those granted international protection 
was around 1–4%. Due to economic reasons (wages, social benefits and GDP 
per capita considerably lower than in the old EU member states) and to cultural 
factors (e.g. unique and rather difficult language), Hungary continues to prevail 
mostly as a transit country in recent mass migration.
Hungary uses a complex set of instruments to implement its broader mi-
gration priorities. These instruments include supporting a visa waiver for cer-
tain bordering countries (Ukraine, Serbia), upholding the established procedu-
re and administrative system of simplified naturalization, expert and financial 
assistance for countries on the Western Balkans which already made steps to-
wards an European integration, policy measures to motivate economic invest-
ments within the framework of the policy of Eastern Opening, and the pro-
active participation in regional (the Budapest Process, the Prague Process, the 
Eastern Partnership Panel on Migration and Asylum) and bilateral dialogs 
(e.g. with the USA, Russia, India), as well as mobility programs (e.g. the region 
of North Africa, countries of the Eastern Partnership). 
In addition to all of the above, we should also be mindful of the fact that as 
a member state of the European Union, Hungary shares some of its migration-
related competencies with the states of the Union. Accordingly, Hungary pays 
attention to EU objectives and the set of instruments available regarding visa 
policy, legal migration and mobility, illegal migration, international protection, 
and optimizing the development impact of migration and mobility, although 
the Hungarian Government has developed a new, reformist approach since 
the migration crisis of 2015, gradually breaking away from the Union’s federa-
list frames and structures.22 This is important, because membership in the EU 
also means that the decisions, appeals, and hardships of other member states 
have an immediate effect on Hungarian migration trends: the economic deve-
lopment and the social services of certain member states attract migrants who 
consider Hungary a transit country, and the inadequacies of a member state 
in migration management increase the migratory pressure on Hungary.
In addition, migration also involves public security and national security risks. 
One factor in this is that some Hungarian borders will remain the external 
border of the European Union and the Schengen area in the foreseeable futu-
re, with the responsibility and tasks of managing the Union’s border section. 
21 Ibidem.
22 See http://www.kormany.hu/en/the-prime-minister/news/prime-minister-viktor-orban-proposes-
ten-point-action-plan [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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Hungary has proven to be an eminent student since the beginning – when jo-
ining the Schengen area in December 21, 2007 –, and September 15, 2015, 
when the fencing system put in place on the Serbian and the Hungarian bor-
der section started to operate, did not change this. Conversely, Hungary – with 
periodical technical and human resource support from the Visegrad countries 
– continues to carry out its external border protection tasks, assuming even 
more responsibility and financial costs.23
2.2. Migration Policy 
(Dániel Horváth, Hanga Horváth-Sántha, Sándor Gallai)
2.2.1. Legal Framework: The History, the Pillars, 
and the Features of the Legal System of Migration 
(Dániel Horváth)
2.2.1.1. Asylum Outlook
The mass influx of Hungarians from Transylvania fleeing from the Ro-
manian revolution in 1989–1991 was the first instance of Hungary facing 
the process of cross-border, or international migration. Although the unplan-
ned migration put a substantial admission, procedure, and administrative bur-
den on the country, the beyond the border Hungarians were – and still are 
– a preferential group for the political leadership, so their reception and sup-
port became a priority issue in national policy. Shortly after the first waves 
of migration initiated by the Romanian revolution, the effects the South Sla-
vic crisis of 1991–1995 started to reach the country, and lead to the reception 
of tens of thousands of refugees from Vojvodina, the Slavonian part of Cro-
atia, as well as refugees of German, Gypsy, and Serbian ethnicities. Although 
leaders of the young democracy that just got rid of the shackles of socialism 
had the right political intention and good will, the sparseness of information 
on what was happening in the war, and the lack of experience in asylum ad-
ministration made it difficult at first to care for about fifty thousand refugees. 
Still, these initial experiences led to Hungary – then applying the rules of the 
1951 Geneva Convention with territorial restrictions only – accepting its first 
asylum right law, which now conforms to the traditions of European asylum le-
gislations.24 Full accordance with the Union measures, the reforms mandatory 
23 Not counting the cost of the second defence line to be completed by the middle of 2017, 
the fencing system put in place over a 170 kilometer border section between Serbia and Hungary has 
drawn about 200 billion HUF from the taxpayers’ money.
24 CXXXIX Act of 1997 on the right to asylum.
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due to the country’s accession to the Union in 2004, had to wait until Janu-
ary 1, 2008, when the new, fully EU-conform asylum law of the country came 
into force.25 The so-called executive regulations of these laws, which included 
the precepts, declared the procedural rules, the reception standards, and the 
rules of integration. The frame for these is set by Article XIV, paragraphs (2) 
and (3) of the Fundamental Law, which state the principle of non-refoulement, and 
of the conditional right to asylum.26 Major, institutional level changes of the period 
thereafter were related to the initiation of an asylum detention, the reform of the 
integration system, and the inauguration of certain special forms of procedure.
On July 1, 2013 – as a reaction to another rise in the number of asylum se-
ekers, and the infringement procedure started by the European Commission 
– along with an open reception facility structure, the aliens policing detention 
practice was replaced by a so-called asylum detention practice, conforming to 
the Reception Directive. Even though the use of asylum detention was more 
of an exception rather than the general practice until 2016, Hungary has to this 
day remained one of the few member states of the Union where this legal in-
strument has developed to be a fully-fledged element in the system of asylum 
reception. The applicants spend an average of 45–53 days in closed asylum de-
tention accommodations, six months is the longest. In case of families, the law 
sets the limit at thirty days, while unaccompanied minors can not be detained. 
Newly emerging intentions of the legislator can bring major changes into this 
process, inasmuch as the Parliament approves the most recent asylum reform 
package of the Government, according to which, asylum seekers would have 
to remain in transit zones for the entire time of the asylum procedure, and – in 
case it comes into force – the new regulation would also include those currently 
residing in reception facilities within the country. Consequently, we can fore-
cast the elimination of open reception centres, as well as the asylum detention 
system in the medium term. 
In reference to the defects of the former integration and support system (e.g. 
systematic weaknesses, the migration practices of clients, the labor market and 
language barriers) the new system, coming into force on January 1, 2014, was 
a fundamental reform of the integration system based on the financial support, 
and the services in kind provided for asylum seekers and people granted inter-
national protection. The latter emphasized the bilateral nature of the integra-
tion process, and introduced the institution of an integration contract, which 
led to more emphasis on the individual responsibility of clients. In 2014, the 
asylum authority entered into close to 600 contracts. As of June 1, 2016, ho-
25 LXXX Act of 2007 on the right to asylum.
26 See http://www.kormany.hu/download/e/02/00000/The%20New%20Fundamental%20Law%20
of%20Hungary.pdf [accessed: 5.03.2017].
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wever, the asylum integration system has also – along with several other me-
asures aiming to raise the effectiveness of the asylum procedure – undergone 
major changes: the institution of integration contracts was ceased regarding 
the future, and the possibility for other financial and in kind benefit, based on 
the asylum law, also ceased. In the Government’s view, the primary goal sho-
uld be the support of Hungarian families, and the support system of asylum 
seekers or third country citizens granted international protection should be ali-
gned with that of Hungarian citizens. The unspoken message of the indisputa-
bly anti-migration package of measures was to create less appealing conditions 
for the migrants, and strengthen the transit migration character of the country 
even more.
As a clear governmental reflection to the European migration crisis started 
in 2015, the rules of the Hungarian asylum procedure were notably changed 
as of 1 August 2015: the asylum procedure is no longer divided into two parts, 
and the rules of the preliminary assessment procedure were removed from the 
law. The asylum authority decides in a uniform procedure on the possibility 
of the Dublin procedure, and on the possibility of an accelerated procedure.27 
In accordance with the amended Section 47 of the Law on Asylum, appli-
cations for recognition as refugee or subsidiary protected person are subjec-
ted to examination by the refugee authority after their submission. During 
the examination, the refugee authority determines whether conditions are met 
for applying the Dublin Regulations, and determines whether the application 
is inadmissible, or if an accelerated procedure is possible.28 For inadmissible 
applications or those evaluated in accelerated procedures, a decision must be 
made within fifteen days after identifying the reason that justifies the inadmis-
sibility or the accelerated procedure. If no shorter-term procedure is possible, 
it must be carried out within sixty days after the submission of the application 
– according to the original rules.
However, given the longer-term implications, hereby we refer to the fact 
that on March 17, 2016, in its decision number C-695/15 PPU, taken in the 
case of Shiraz Baig Mirza vs OIN (Office of Immigration and Nationality), 
the Court of Justice of the European Union ruled that the Hungarian legi-
slation and its practical application complies with the Dublin III Regulation 
and the relevant refugee guidelines, which allows for a so-called inadmissibility 
27 See Section 51 Act Nr. 127 of 2015 on amendment of laws regarding temporary security border 
closure and migration.
28 Accelerated procedure is typically for asylum application lodged in the “transit zones” at the Southern 
borders of Hungary. For its procedural shortcomings, see the report of the Amnesty International entitled 
“Fenced out”, pp. 16–19, available at: https://www.amnesty.org/en/documents/eur27/2614/2015/en/ 
[accessed: 25.02.2017].
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investigation in case of applicants taken over within the Dublin system as well. 
Among others, an application is considered unacceptable in case the applicant 
is originated from a so-called safe third country, yet he/she applies for asylum 
in one of the Member States. Thus, even after the Dublin takeover, Hunga-
rian authorities can legally examine the applicability of the safe third country 
concept, and if conditions are met, the applicant’s expulsion to that safe third 
country may be ordered legitimately.29
Depending on the outcome of the judicial decision made in the Dublin pro-
cedure (i.e. whether the Member State charged is responsible of examining the 
application, or not) the Hungarian refugee authority orders the termination or 
continues the suspended asylum procedure. Legal remedies are provided for the 
applicant in both cases.
The duration of the judicial review is sixty days according to the law 
(but often more – from 4 to 9 months – in practice).30
General experience has shown that the procedures usually take more time 
than expected not just because of the Dublin procedures being time-consu-
ming, but mainly due to the excessive workload of the courts. However, sta-
tistics are improved by the fact that the majority of applicants (80–90%) ab-
scond for an unknown location before the procedure is actually carried out, 
which though increases the number of terminated asylum procedures, but it is 
favorable for the number of cases involving judicial review. 
In comparison with the number of asylum applications in 2013 (18,900) 
and 2014 (42,777), there was an unprecedented increase (177,135) in terms 
of asylum applications in Hungary last year. Comparing the figures from 
the first quarter of 2015 and that of 2016, we can clearly see direct effects of the 
government measures last year: while there were 33,549 applications submitted 
between January and March 2015, the figures intensively fell down a year after 
(7,182 applications up to the end of March in 2016). In total, there were alto-
gether 29,432 asylum applications registered in Hungary in 2016.
Even though there is a high number of applications, most clients (97%) 
do not wait out the close of their procedure. This is also attested by the fact that 
the most common reason for eliminating procedures was the clients disappe-
aring to unknown locations. The ratio of people recognized by the asylum autho-
rity as a refugee or a person granted other international protection was between 
1 and 4% in comparison to total applications in the 2013–2016 time period. 
29 See http://curia.europa.eu/juris/documents.jsf?num=C-695/15 [accessed: 15.02.2017].
30 For more information, see the appeal rules under http://www.asylumineurope.org/reports/country/
Hungary/asylum-procedure/procedures/regular-procedure [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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2.2.1.2. Aliens Policing Outlook
In Hungary, aliens policing tasks are carried out by the Immigration and 
Asylum Office, and the Police, with shared competence. As the general rule, 
the Police takes action against migrants arriving to the country illegally, when 
arrested in the border area, and carry out their expulsion and deportation to 
a third country or their country of origin at its own discretion. A change 
in competence takes place if the client submits an asylum application, or the 
Police can not remove the client from the country within 72 hours. In either 
case, the client is transferred to the competent regional directorship of the 
Immigration and Asylum Office.
Hungarian law – in attention to the country being a member state of the 
Union, and replacing the formerly unified regulation31 – now settles the ru-
les for people with the right to free movement, and the entry and stay of third 
country citizens in separate sources of law (Act I. and II. of 2007), amended 
by implementing regulations. The constitutional framework concerns the pro-
tection of sovereignty and national identity, and related state tasks.32 These 
could have received an even more definite form in the proposed seventh amend-
ment of the Fundamental Law in October 2016, if the initiative did not fail, 
due to lack of support from the opposition.33
The mass influx of migration in 2015 created a new situation, however, 
and the legislator quickly responded, on the ground of the security interests 
of Hungary and the Union. The entry into force of the new legislation,34 cre-
ating a legal basis for the construction of a fence on the border between Hunga-
ry and Serbia, in conjunction with further legislative amendments35 criminali-
zing irregular entry and damage to the fence, has created a hostile environment 
towards those seeking asylum. Nevertheless, in relation to taking action against 
illegal migration in a more narrow sense, we have to note that the Police em-
ploys an adequate number of patrols and technical equipment in order to redu-
ce the security risk possibly caused by illegal migrants to a minimum, through 
capturing, arresting, registering, and officially controlling them. Since the 2015 
crisis, the Police can lean on the Hungarian Defence Force for primarily logi-
stical and – in the transit zones – medical assistance, as authorized by the above 
mentioned legislative actions. 
31 See The XXXIX Act of 2001 on the entrance and stay of foreigners.
32 See The National Avowal chapter of the Fundamental Law of Hungary.
33 The above mentioned amendment could have become a constitutional barrier to the European 
Commission’s “mandatory settlement quota” plans as well. 
34 See Act Nr 127 of 2015 on amendment of laws regarding temporary security border closure and 
migration http://mkogy.jogtar.hu/?page=show&docid=a1500127.TV [accessed: 20.02.2017].
35 See Act Nr 140 of 2015 on amendment of certain laws regarding management of mass migration, 
available at: http://mkogy.jogtar.hu/?page=show&docid=a1500140.TV [accessed: 25.03.2017].
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31 See The XXXIX Act of 2001 on the entrance and stay of foreigners.
32 See The National Avowal chapter of the Fundamental Law of Hungary.
33 The above mentioned amendment could have become a constitutional barrier to the European 
Commission’s “mandatory settlement quota” plans as well. 
34 See Act Nr 127 of 2015 on amendment of laws regarding temporary security border closure and 
migration http://mkogy.jogtar.hu/?page=show&docid=a1500127.TV [accessed: 20.02.2017].
35 See Act Nr 140 of 2015 on amendment of certain laws regarding management of mass migration, 
available at: http://mkogy.jogtar.hu/?page=show&docid=a1500140.TV [accessed: 25.03.2017].
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According to the current legislation, the authorities do not start aliens poli-
cing procedures against illegal migrants – in case no other crime is committed, 
such as damaging the border barrier – intercepted within 8 kilometers from 
the border, but accompany them behind the fence, indicating that asylum ap-
plications can be submitted in one of the transit zones – presently operating 
in Röszke and in Tompa. Based on the authorities making a decision on the 
acceptability of their applications, the country can be entered only in this way 
(then within 8 days). 
The present legislation change before the Parliament would modify this re-
gulation in a way that in the future, all migrant persons not able to prove their 
identity, but applying for asylum, caught by the Police anywhere in the country, 
would be transported to a transit zone established in the southern, external bor-
derline, and the client had to wait out the end of the asylum procedure there. 
In order to understand the professional justification of the above mentio-
ned governmental actions, we have to refer to the trends of illegal migration 
of the past few years. According to the statistics, illegal migration towards Hun-
gary has grown steadily since 2012, intercepted only by the governmental ac-
tions and the tangible border barrier established on the border between Serbia 
and Hungary in the last quarter of 2015. Looking back, the Police arrested over 
50,000 persons for unauthorized border crossing or its attempt in 2014. 
In 2015 – mainly before the southern border barrier started to operate –, the 
Hungarian authorities took measures against over 428,000 persons for illegal 
activities (the above mentioned unauthorized border crossing or its attempt for 
the most part), and this number went down to about 35,000 in 2016, due to 
the measures outlined above. Illegal arrivals from outside of Europe come tho-
ugh Turkey, Greece, Macedonia and Serbia, or on the Turkey-Bulgaria-Serbia 
route to reach Hungary, and the well known event of 2015 brought no chan-
ge in this trend. The proportion of unauthorized border crossings and their 
attempt is exceptionally high on the border between Serbia and Hungary 
(about 90% in a countrywide comparison). 
Also, it should be understood that the general tendency of the past few 
years showed a significant percentage of illegal migrants (over 96%) submitting 
an asylum application. As the large number of police arrests show, the problem 
was not the interception or arrest of people involved in illegal migration, but 
the abuse of those asylum procedures that are conducted according to mostly 
unified European standards. Prior to the more severe measures of 2015, the 
most effective way to get to Western Europe was this: after the Police caught 
and arrested the illegal migrants on the external Schengen border, the clients 
filed asylum applications to avoid aliens policing detention, and were placed 
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in open reception centres for the most part. Taking advantage of their right 
of free movement within Hungary during the asylum procedure, and the lack 
of control on the internal borders, they could reach their country of destination 
– Germany or Sweden in most cases – within 24 hours. We have to make a note 
about the administrative practice of these member states: there has been very 
limited possibilities for the detention of clients – even on the very height of the 
migration crisis –, essentially nothing hindered their free movement, and the 
escalation of social tensions. With its latest measures, the Hungarian political 
leadership seeks to constrain the processes that induce this circular migration, 
and wants to cut the reinforcement flow of illegal migration.
2.2.1.3. Citizenship and National Policy Outlook
As we have already mentioned, Article D of the Fundamental Law of Hun-
gary assumes responsibility for Hungarians living beyond its borders, and 
Article G provides provisions related to Hungarian citizenship. The detailed ru-
les for the origin, acquisition, and deprivation of Hungarian citizenship are laid 
out in Act LV of 1993, amended with the possibility of simplified naturaliza-
tion for beyond the border Hungarians since 2011.36
From the organizational perspective, it is worth to note that the authority re-
sponsible for citizenship affairs was the Office of Immigration and Nationality 
from 2000 until January 1, 2017. At the beginning of 2017, however, this re-
sponsibility – as outlined in the section on the Institutional system – was trans-
ferred to the Government Office of the Capital City Budapest for the most part, 
and to the Prime Minister’s Office for the less – generating predominantly cen-
tral governing tasks. The former institution with exclusive jurisdiction over citi-
zenship issues continues its operation as the Immigration and Asylum Office. 
The practice of simplified naturalization is worth to mention from the per-
spective of our topic, especially because this procedure has been often abu-
sed, though the target value was reached, and the political leadership presently 
in power has since the beginnings had the national policy objective of making 
it easier for the Hungarians beyond the border to gain citizenship, and be able 
to show off one million new Hungarian citizens. According to the rules of sim-
plified naturalization,37 an application can be submitted by people who fully 
meet the following (joint) requirements of preferential naturalization:
– he or any of his ancestors was a Hungarian citizen or if he serves 
reason to believe his or her origin is from Hungary,
36 As of March 1, 2013, the legislator introduced further changes and facilitations (regarding the acting 
body, and the scope of people entitled to preferential naturalization) in the simplified naturalization process.
37 See Act LV of 1993, paragraph 4.§ (3); see also http://www.allampolgarsag.gov.hu/images/angol.pdf 
[accessed: 2.02.2017].
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– he proves his knowledge of the Hungarian language (inspected by the 
body receiving the application),
– according to Hungarian law, he has no criminal record and is not un-
der prosecution, and
– his naturalization does not violate the public and national security 
of Hungary.
In our time, mainly Ukrainian, but to some extent also Romanian cri-
minal circles support criminal organizations to gain Hungarian citizenship 
in a fraudulent way, to gain Hungarian (and thus, EU) travel documents 
in particular. The popularity of Hungarian travel documents is most likely due 
to the fact that they can be used for travelling to 150 countries of the world visa-
free, and they are much easier to acquire than American or British documents 
for instance. Abuses have to do with the formal, or total lack of inspection 
on the knowledge of the Hungarian language in the first place. In addition, ac-
cording present judicial practice, the lack of knowledge of the Hungarian lan-
guage is not sufficient to revoke the citizenship, revoking requires the proof 
of other circumstances giving rise to further abuse.
2.2.2. Institutional Framework: Main Stakeholders 
and Reception Facilities 
(Dániel Horváth)
The Hungarian institutional administration system of migration has seve-
ral actors: along the hierarchical structure of the home affairs sector, several de-
partments carry co-ordinate responsibilities, and many international, intergo-
vernmental and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) cooperate. 
The prime actor is the ministry responsible for aliens policing, asylum, and 
fostering the social integration of foreigners, as it governs the executive organi-
zations responsible for implementing aliens policing and asylum rights. Other 
ministries are also involved in the process of migration administration: 
The ministry responsible for foreign policy (e.g. Schengen visa issues, •	
foreign policy embedding, and securing coherence); 
The Prime Minister’s Office (attending to general interdepartmental •	
coordination, national policy, regulating citizenship, and administe-
ring simplified naturalization); 
The ministry responsible for employment policy (authorizing the em-•	
ployment of third country citizens in Hungary, administrative contri-
bution, allocating quotas, managing the employment policy situation 
of migrants, providing services), and 
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The ministry responsible for health care, education, social and retire-•	
ment policy, and advancing equal opportunities in society (in educa-
tional issues, the social benefits for foreigners, their social rights, their 
social integration, the placement of unaccompanied minors, and the 
integration of foreigners in general). 
On the implementation level, the two main aliens policing authorities direc-
ted by the Minister of Interior are the Immigration and Asylum Office38, and 
the Police. 
The Immigration and Asylum Office and its regional organizations attend 
to visa consultation tasks in the Schengen visa issuing procedure, and have the 
following competencies: issuing residence and settlement permits, a wide range 
of coercive measures that can be enacted against foreigners, carrying out asy-
lum procedures and the assessment of statelessness, providing specific services 
for recognized refugees/subsidiary protected persons/admitted persons, and 
providing travel documents for foreigners. 
The migration related tasks of the Police – apart from protecting the state 
border and monitoring cross-border traffic – include in-depth control, impo-
sing aliens policing detention and expulsion, and carrying out deportations. 
Finally, beyond the level of authorities, contact and cooperation with in-
ternational and intergovernmental organizations in the field of migration and 
asylum should be highlighted [including, but not limited to organizations such 
as the UN High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR), the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM), the International Committee of the Red 
Cross (ICRC), and the International Centre for Migration Policy Develop-
ment (ICMPD)], and the Hungarian contribution to the activities of relevant 
European Agencies [chiefly the European Asylum Support Office (EASO), and 
the European Border and Coast Guard Agency (FRONTEX)]. 
Apart from the authorities, the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) 
are also crucial actors, who often fill in the niches of Hungarian migration ta-
sks in the system, in areas such as finding employment in the labor market, ho-
using assistance, or organizing language courses.
Recently, Hungary’s institutional reception system has undergone major 
changes, in accordance with the change of priorities in the migration policy. 
Currently in Hungary, there are five different types of reception facilities 
38 The Immigration and Asylum Office, successor of the former Office of Immigration and Nationality, 
has national authority over public authority tasks in relation to asylum and – authority still shared with 
the Police – aliens policing, as of January 1st, 2017. Citizenship and change of name matters, including 
pending administrative cases, were transferred to the Government Office of the Capital City Budapest 
at the date mentioned above, and – as the central governing body for native for registry matters – to the 
Prime Minister’s Office.
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to accommodate asylum seekers and persons granted international protection: 
(open) reception centre (in Kiskunhalas and Vámosszabadi), (open) tempora-
ry reception centre (in Körmend), closed asylum detention centre (Békéscsaba, 
Nyírbátor, Kiskunhalas), community shelter (in Balassagyarmat) and separate 
child protection institutions to accommodate unaccompanied minors (in Fót 
and Hódmezővásárhely). The asylum detention as such was introduced to the 
Hungarian law as of 1st July 2013, as a response to the infringement procedure 
launched by the European Commission criticizing the Hungarian law enforce-
ment practice where asylum seekers could be put into aliens policing detention 
without prejudice to their special status. In 2015, there were 2,393 asylum de-
tentions ordered (1.3%), while in the subsequent year, this number was 2,621 
(8.9%) in total. Statistical figures clearly reflect the shift towards a more severe 
asylum policy that aims to ensure the availability of the applicant for the entire 
length of the asylum procedure.39
The question of what type of reception facility each asylum seeker is placed 
at is decided by the refugee authority in each case, based on the circumstances 
and credibility of the applicant, the available information, and the knowled-
ge of spare capacities. (Accommodating clients in one or another Hungarian 
reception facility according to their status was in practice only from 2008 to 
mid-2013. Subsequently, each open institution could receive clients regardless 
of their status.) In addition, the refugee authority may decide to limit the pla-
ce at which the asylum seeker can stay to a particular area of the country for 
the period of the asylum procedure, which the client must not leave in prin-
ciple. Finally, it is possible to place the applicant at a private accommodation. 
It is worth mentioning that in Hungarian law the alternative to asylum deten-
tion is the so-called asylum bail, which is rarely used by the refugee authori-
ty (in 2014, asylum detention was ordered for 4,829 applicants, and in 2015, 
for 2,393 applicants, which is 11% and 1% of all applicants, respectively).40
As a response to the latest national security challenges and the obvious 
nexus between migration and terrorism, the Hungarian Government announ-
ced to introduce a new reception system, where asylum seekers will be expected 
to remain within one of the so called transit zones (either in Röszke, or Tompa) 
for the entire length of the asylum procedure. Only those who are finally granted 
international protection will be allowed to enter Hungary. Although the gover-
ning rules are not yet available, one thing remains certain: the Hungarian recep-
tion system in its current form will be discontinued in the first half of 2017.
39 “The Latest Modification in Law on Asylum Is”, available at: http://mkogy.jogtar.hu/?page=show 
&docid=a1500127.TV [accessed: 25.02.2017].
40 Statistical data (Issue 2014–2015) are available at: http://www.bmbah.hu/index.php?option=com_
k2&view=item&layout=item&id=492&Itemid=1259&lang=en [accessed: 18.02.2017].
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2.2.3. Other Policies 
(Sándor Gallai)
In order to understand the measures and policies that the Hungarian go-
vernment implemented to tackle irregular mass migration, it can be helpful to 
identify those principles which were expressed by the prime minister41 and co-
uld be regarded as the bottom-line in the formulation of the national-level re-
sponse to the 2015–2016 crisis. The government persistently made a differen-
ce between asylum and immigration policies and insisted that for the former 
European-level decision-making was well-placed, but the latter should prevail 
as a competence of the national governments. Given the amalgamation of refu-
gees and economic migrants in the recent waves of immigration, the European 
asylum policy should rest on effective border control. The government regar-
ded it as a prerequisite not only for minimizing the security risks, but also for 
detaching the illegal migrants from the legitimate asylum-seekers. Moreover, 
in the lack of strict control along the external borders of the Schengen area, it 
would be impossible to avoid the restoration of internal border checks and ma-
intain the free movement of people. In the implementation of a joint Europe-
an refugee policy the Hungarian government demanded to respect and apply 
the “first safe country” principle, in other words: it did not regard the choice 
of the destination country as a fundamental right of the asylum-seekers. The 
government also rejected all compulsory quota mechanisms of reallocation and 
resettlement, it only expressed support for voluntary participation in any such 
EU schemes. The Hungarian leadership argued that permanent solution to the 
crisis could only be given if the responses were to address the causes of people 
fleeing their homeland right in and near the conflict zones and if the countries 
in trouble would be assisted jointly not only by individual states, but also by 
the European Union and the entire international community.
Since the Hungarian government was negative on both the speed and the 
contents of EU reactions to irregular migration, it urged a more effective joint 
European policies based on firm border control, the registration of asylum-se-
ekers, the return of economic migrants and the halt of the migration flows out-
side the territory of the EU. At the same time, the government also took steps 
at national level and introduced policies to end the crisis by stopping – or at 
least diverting – the flow of immigrants arriving to Hungary.
The first major set of policies was designed to establish an effective border 
control at the Southern ends of the country’s territory. To meet this objective, the 
41 Those ideas were expressed in various interviews and speeches documented at the websites of the 
prime minister (http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/ [accessed: 25.02.2017]) and the cabinet (http://www.
kormany.hu/hu [accessed: 25.02.2017]).
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ekers, the return of economic migrants and the halt of the migration flows out-
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control at the Southern ends of the country’s territory. To meet this objective, the 
41 Those ideas were expressed in various interviews and speeches documented at the websites of the 
prime minister (http://www.miniszterelnok.hu/ [accessed: 25.02.2017]) and the cabinet (http://www.
kormany.hu/hu [accessed: 25.02.2017]).
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deployment of physical border barriers42 played a key role by reducing the number 
of illegal border crossing. The first physical obstacles were temporary razor wire fen-
ces,43 which had mostly been produced in correction centers by prison inmates. First 
they were installed by the army44 at the Serbian border, then similar fences were also 
deployed at the Croatian border. However, the actual deployment process was much 
slower than anticipated,45 and it did not prevent thousands of irregular migrants 
crossing the border every day.46 The government transported them to newly created 
transit zones in Budapest, from where they could continue their journey towards 
Austria. When this possibility was suspended, it resulted in a bottleneck and a cha-
otic situation at the Eastern Railway Station of Budapest,47 which only ended after 
the fence along the border had been completed.48 Behind the initially installed razor 
wire fence the government also succeeded to get a temporary security fence erected. 
It was announced that preparatory measures would be taken to secure the Eastern 
borders as well.49
The installment of the wire fences was facilitated by a legal change (Act 
no. CXXVII/2015) that created a 10 meter wide zone along the borderline wi-
thin which the state – in return for compensation – acquired the right to use 
the land on public interest. Since it was obviously rather easy to cut and pass 
the temporary wire fence, the governing majority also decided to declare the 
hindering of fence building as well as the damaging and the illegal crossing 
of the fence to be a criminal act which should be sentenced for imprison-
ment or expulsion (Act no. CXL/2015). For the legal submission of asylum 
claims two transit zones were open at the Serbian-Hungarian border. Howe-
ver, in order to prevent mass immigration, a rather low daily cap (originally 
set at 15, later reduced to 10) has been applied on the number of new entrants 
42 Although fences can also be found at parts of the Spanish-Moroccan, Greek-Turkish, Bulgarian-
Turkish and Latvian-Russian borders, Hungary received severe criticism from its neighbors, the EU and 
international organizations (e.g. https://www.nytimes.com/2015/06/19/world/europe/hungarys-plan-to-
build-fence-to-deter-migrants-is-criticized.html?_r=0 [accessed: 25.02.2017]).
43 The official name was Quickly Installed Wire Barrier (Hungarian abbreviation: GYODA).
44 They were assisted by a small number of public workers (e.g. http://24.hu/belfold/2015/07/31/
hatarzar-azt-mondtak-talaltak-munkat1-a-keritest-fogjuk-epiteni/ [accessed: 25.02.2017]).
45 The delay led to the resignation of the minister in charge (http://www.portfolio.hu/vallalatok/
lemondott_hende_csaba_honvedelmi_miniszter.219212.html [accessed: 5.03.2017]). 
46 A. Juhász, C. Molnár, “Magyarország sajátos helyzete az európi menekültválságban”, 2016, p. 268, 
http://www.tarki.hu/hu/publications/SR/2016/13juhasz.pdf [accessed: 28.02.2017].
47 “The Social Aspects of the 2015 Migration Crisis in Hungary”, eds B. Simonovits, A. Bernát, 2016, 
p. 8, http://www.tarki.hu/hu/news/2016/kitekint/20160330_refugees.pdf [accessed: 25.03.2017]. 
48 The closing of the green borders led to a clash between the police and a group of immigrants (https://
vs.hu/kozelet/osszes/osszecsapas-a-hataron-kimozditottak-a-keritest-0916 [accessed: 12.03.2017]).
49 Due to the low number of illegal border crossing at the Ukrainian and Romanian borders, those 
plans were not implemented. All the government did was some limited landscaping at a small part of the 
Romanian border.
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among whom the vulnerable persons with special needs have enjoyed priority. 
The low figures demonstrated two things: on the one hand, the government did 
not want to introduce a mechanism that would encourage migrants to arrive 
in huge numbers at the Hungarian borders; on the other hand, it offered the po-
ssibility of saving some capacities of the naturally overburdened civil servants and 
agencies that were in charge of dealing with the cases of the arriving immigrants. 
The transit zones have been jointly operated by the Immigration and Asylum 
Office and the army. Along with the installation of the physical border barriers 
and the opening of transit zones at the Southern ends, the existing transit zones 
of the capital city, Budapest, were closed down. The government also decided to 
mark an 8 kilometer wide security zone along the country’s borders, and the cor-
responding law (Act no. XCIV/2016) stipulated that anyone caught within that 
zone, unable to prove his/her identity, shall be accompanied to one of the official 
crossing points and expelled from the country without starting an asylum proce-
dure. Those who wish to apply for asylum are allowed to return to Hungary, but 
only through the transit zones for which they have to queue along with all other 
migrants arriving at the border. After that legislation had been adopted, every 
day an average 10-20 persons were accompanied to the border crossings.
The governing majority intended to increase the level of security for which 
the expansion of police and military capabilities was also necessary. As the mi-
gration crisis escalated, the government increased the number of permanent 
and stand-by military presence to ca. 6,000 officers who were also supported 
by 750 – mostly transport – vehicles. The maneuvers of the vehicles and the 
transport of military and police units were facilitated by the recent building 
of simple police roads all along the Serbian and Croatian borders. At the same 
time the government also decided to set up new units of police Border Guard. 
The hiring and training of the new border policemen takes place gradually with 
a target number of 3,000 new recruitments. The expansion of police forces and 
the recruitment of new border guarding policemen would allow ordinary poli-
cemen stationed at the borders to return to their original post.
At the proposal of the government, parliament codified a new case of spe-
cial legal order, a state of emergency for situations when an emergency is caused 
by mass immigration (Act no. CXLII/2015). The conditions of this particu-
lar migration-caused state of emergency were primarily defined by the num-
ber of asylum seekers: the state of emergency shall be declared if the number 
of asylum claims in Hungary exceeded a daily average of 500 in a month/750 
in a fortnight/800 in a week or if the number of immigrants in the transit zo-
nes surpassed a daily average of 1,000 in a month/1,500 in a fortnight/2,000 
in a week. However, the state of emergency may also be declared if migration 
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leads to a situation which poses direct risk to the public order of any settlement 
(i.e. not only the villages and the towns at the border, but also anywhere else 
in the territory of Hungary). When a state of emergency is declared for mass 
immigration, the police enjoys extended operational competences, including 
the possibility of imposing restrictions on traffic, closing buildings and public 
areas, forcing people to leave or hindering them to enter to or departure from 
such places, limiting the operation of public and publicly used institutions, and 
entering and staying in private homes50 for the purpose of check-up or for the 
observation and securing of a scene.
Under such special legal order the army also acquires the right to use we-
apons in violent conflicts to protect the borders; to settle a conflict situation 
which presents a direct risk to the protection of the border; to implement me-
asures that are essential for tackling mass immigration; to stop violent actions 
which aim at disturbing the order at the state borders. When the special legal 
order is provoked by mass immigration, the state of emergency can be initiated 
by the national police chief and the director general of the Immigration and 
Asylum Office and it can be declared in a decree by the government at the pro-
posal of the minister in charge. Once the act came into effect, the government 
declared a state of emergency nationwide. In September 2016 the government 
decided to extend it till 8 March 2017.
The policies against massive irregular migration have been repeatedly critici-
zed by both the European Union and various international and domestic orga-
nizations. The government will certainly continue to face legal and political di-
sputes over its measures and actions. Nevertheless, the inflow of asylum seekers 
slowed down considerably and their number dropped drastically (Figure 2.3).
The spectacularly lower figures were partly the result of domestic policies 
(e.g. more effective border control, bottlenecks in transit zones), but certain 
international developments (e.g. more rigorous policies in receiving countries, 
the Turkey-EU deal) also contributed to the change in situation. However, the 
level of cooperation between the asylum seekers and the authorities remained 
very low and more than 95% of the registered asylum claimants continued to 
disappear within the Schengen area without waiting for the termination of the-
ir asylum procedure. To put an end to the possibility of asylum seekers abusing 
their situation and the lack of internal borders within the Schengen area, the 
government made two important decisions. First, in February 2017, it agreed 
to hamper illegal border crossing by having a second fence built to the border, 
parallel with the already standing physical barrier, on the other side of the po-
lice road.51 The new barrier shall be ready by May 2017. It will have electronic 
50 The latter is only allowed in the possession of a written command.
51 E.g. http://magyaridok.hu/belfold/lazar-janos-ujabb-hatarzar-letesiteserol-dontott-kormany-1436 
536/ [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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detectors and loudspeakers to warn the approaching persons in three different 
languages (English, Farsi and Arabic) of the illegality of crossing the (green) bor-
der.52 Second, the government also presented a bill, which was adopted by par-
liament in March (Act no. XX/2017). Among else it introduced two substantial 
changes: on the one hand, all legally arriving asylum seekers will need to wait 
in the transit zone until their claim will have been processed by the authorities; 
on the other hand, the 8 kilometer border zone will be extended to the entire 
country, so regardless of the place they are captured, all unregistered immigrants 
shall be taken back to the transit zones; the open reception centers will be clo-
sed down and their current 67 residents will also be transported to the transit 
zones, which will be expanded to a capacity of 100 and offer accommodation, 
health, social, telecom and meal service facilities.53 The transit zones are open to 
Serbia,54 but only those will get admittance to Hungary, whose claim for inter-
national protection is found grounded by the Hungarian authorities.
Figure 2.3
The Total Number of Registered Asylum Seekers in Hungary  
in 2015 and 2016
Source: Immigration and Asylum Office, 
ht tp : / /www.bmbah.hu/ index .php?opt ion= 
com_k2&view=item&layout=item&id=177&Itemid 
=965&lang=hu [accessed: 25.02.2017].
52 The loudspeakers are planned to say: “Attention, attention. I’m warning you that you are at the 
Hungarian border. If you damage the fence, cross illegally, or attempt to cross, it’s counted to be a crime 
in Hungary. I’m warning you to hold back from committing this crime. You can submit your asylum 
application at the transit zone” (http://www.reuters.com/article/us-europe-migrants-hungary-fence-id 
USKBN1692MH [accessed: 25.02.2017]).
53 Http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20170328-bakondi-mostantol-senki-sem-lephet-be-illegalisan-
magyarorszagra.html [accessed: 25.02.2017].
54 In 2015 the parliament adopted the Act no. CVI/2015, which enabled the government to issue 
a decree on the list of safe third countries. As it includes Serbia, the governmentargues that arrivals 
from the Southern border should not be eligible for international protection in Hungary as they arrived from 
a safe country.
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2.2.4. Social Integration of Migrants and Refugees 
(Hanga Horváth-Sántha)
As the European experiences show, both migrant as well as refugee integra-
tion is a complex process including economic, legal, social, cultural and educa-
tional aspects. Factors that have an impact on the possibility of social inclusion 
are – among others – the legal norms concerning the situation of the migrants 
and refugees, the attitude of the host society towards them, the possibility to 
learn the language (and the difficulty of the given language) and access to the 
labour market.
It should also be noted that the integration of persons in need of internatio-
nal protection (i.e. refugees, persons with subsidiary protection or other type of 
protection) differ from other categories of migrants (labour migrants, intra-EU 
migrants, migrants with family status etc). The former category is often refer-
red to as a particularly vulnerable group, nevertheless with very different demo-
graphics and skills, requiring specific integration policies.55 Due to the nature 
of their forced migration – often paired with traumatic experiences and psy-
chological distress –, humanitarian migrants often need more targeted measures 
to be able to strengthen the rather weak attachment to the host society and to 
be able to integrate fully into the labour market.56
In the literature as well as in the official policy documents of the European 
Union on the subject matter it is often emphasised that integration is a two-
sided process, requiring the same efforts from both the members and institu-
tions of the host society as well as from the persons who have been granted the 
right to stay in a country which is not their country of origin. The way of con-
sidering the integration process as a two-way process is captured well in the 
communication of the European Commission as well. In its Communication 
on Integration, Immigration and Employment the Commission highlights that 
“Integration should be understood as a two-way process based on mutual ri-
ghts and corresponding obligations of legally resident third country nationals 
and the host society which provides for full participation of the immigrant. 
This implies on the one hand that it is the responsibility of the host society 
to ensure that the formal rights of immigrants are in place in such a way that 
the individual has the possibility of participating in economic, social, cultural 
and civil life and on the other, that immigrants respect the fundamental norms 
and values of the host society and participate actively in the integration process, 
55 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, “Labour Market Integration 
of Refugees: Strategies and Good Practice”, 2016, p. 20, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg 
Data/etudes/STUD/2016/578956/IPOL_STU(2016)578956_EN.pdf, p. 20 [accessed: 25.02.2017].
56 Ibidem.
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without having to relinquish their own identity.”57 The meaning and impor-
tance of the two sides of the same coin was also reinforced by the Commission 
in its Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals in April 2016.58 
Notwithstanding the different policy documents on EU level, integration re-
mains primarily under national competence.
The quote underlines the important and fragile balance between the rights 
and the duties of the migrants and refugees who are granted a residence permit 
in the country of destination. In relation to the migrant population significant 
research has been conducted regarding their social integration and labour mar-
ket integration in Hungary, showing optimistic results on their labour market 
integration and – to a certain extent – on their social integration as well. But 
regarding the refugees there is no available open source data on the current size 
of the refugee population in Hungary (their number is estimated at around 
2,500 according to government circles), but it has been a clear trend – at least 
for the past decade – that an overwhelming majority of those granted refugee 
protection leave the country.59 Hence, assessing the successes of social inclusion 
and integration policies is only possibly through the small fraction of recogni-
sed refugees who actually decided to stay in Hungary during the past one or 
two decades, or those who came as other types of migrants not primarily fleeing 
from war or persecution. The same trend of leaving the country in short time 
was also very clear during the migrant crisis in 2015 when 97% of the persons 
entering as asylum seekers almost immediately left the country,60 the majority 
of them not even awaiting the end of the asylum process. This trend, however, 
was not new and solely induced by the migrant crises, but a well-known prac-
tice for the Immigration and Asylum Office already much earlier. As a conse-
quence, the assessment of the success of social integration policies in relation to 
persons with international protection status is somewhat difficult and poten-
tially misleading due to the relatively small numbers. 
The migration research focusing on the social as well as the labour market 
integration on migrants in Hungary has during the past couple of years in lar-
ge parts been financed through the European Integration Fund61, which has 
57 European Commission, “Communication on Integration, Immigration and Employment”, 2003, 
pp. 17–18, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/LVN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:c10611 [accessed: 
25.02.2017].
58 Communication from the European Commission, “Action Plan on He Integration of Third 
Country National”, 2016, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what- 
we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160607/
communication_action_plan_integration_third-country_nationals_en.pdf [accessed: 25.02.2017]. 
59 G. Demény, op. cit., p. 117.
60 MTA MM, “Az Európába irányuló...”
61 Re-named to Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund in the EU budget period stretching 
from 2014 to 2020.
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55 European Parliament, Directorate General for Internal Policies, “Labour Market Integration 
of Refugees: Strategies and Good Practice”, 2016, p. 20, available at: http://www.europarl.europa.eu/Reg 
Data/etudes/STUD/2016/578956/IPOL_STU(2016)578956_EN.pdf, p. 20 [accessed: 25.02.2017].
56 Ibidem.
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without having to relinquish their own identity.”57 The meaning and impor-
tance of the two sides of the same coin was also reinforced by the Commission 
in its Action Plan on the integration of third country nationals in April 2016.58 
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ket integration in Hungary, showing optimistic results on their labour market 
integration and – to a certain extent – on their social integration as well. But 
regarding the refugees there is no available open source data on the current size 
of the refugee population in Hungary (their number is estimated at around 
2,500 according to government circles), but it has been a clear trend – at least 
for the past decade – that an overwhelming majority of those granted refugee 
protection leave the country.59 Hence, assessing the successes of social inclusion 
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was also very clear during the migrant crisis in 2015 when 97% of the persons 
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integration on migrants in Hungary has during the past couple of years in lar-
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57 European Commission, “Communication on Integration, Immigration and Employment”, 2003, 
pp. 17–18, available at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/LVN/TXT/?uri=uriserv:c10611 [accessed: 
25.02.2017].
58 Communication from the European Commission, “Action Plan on He Integration of Third 
Country National”, 2016, available at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/sites/homeaffairs/files/what- 
we-do/policies/european-agenda-migration/proposal-implementation-package/docs/20160607/
communication_action_plan_integration_third-country_nationals_en.pdf [accessed: 25.02.2017]. 
59 G. Demény, op. cit., p. 117.
60 MTA MM, “Az Európába irányuló...”
61 Re-named to Asylum, Migration and Integration Fund in the EU budget period stretching 
from 2014 to 2020.
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contributed to the realisation of larger empirical studies based on quantitati-
ve as well as qualitative methods, but also to civil society projects aiming the 
practical facilitation of the social inclusion process.62 The previously mentio-
ned research funded by the European Integration Fund has been able to stretch 
the research to all relevant (policy) areas within the field of integration of mi-
grants, as stated in the Zaragoza Declaration as well.63 Migration research was, 
however, self-evidently an existing important research even in earlier years, but 
then the focus within research on integration matters was mainly on the legal 
and/or policy aspects of social inclusion (as well as labour market integration), 
including several case studies.
2.2.4.1. Labour Market Integration of Migrants in Hungary
Despite the fact that the question of employment situation and labour mar-
ket integration are integral parts of the policy discourse on integration of mi-
grants, research purely focusing on these matters has been relatively underre-
presented in the past decade.64 At the same time it is important to mention that 
almost all the research in relation to the social inclusion of migrants in Hungary 
dealt with the question of labour market integration as well. Analysis of surveys 
conducted by – among others – the Hungarian Demographic Research Insti-
tute65 suggest that migrants in Hungary have a higher employment situation 
than the Hungarian population, which is especially true regarding the migrants 
of Hungarian origin.66 According to the mentioned surveys ethnic Hungarian 
migrants have a higher employment and activity rate in comparison to the non-
migrant citizens, and their unemployment rate is lower among them.67
From the outcome of the survey “Migrants in Hungary”68 in 2009 (also 
funded by the European Integration Fund) it also became clear that the mi-
grant groups showed great variation in terms of employment and labour mar-
ket activity.69 The survey contained, i.e., a detailed comparison between six dif-
62 A. Kováts, “Bevándorlók integrációja Magyarországon: korábbi kutatások adatai alapjai”, [in:] 
Bevándorlás és integráció, ed. A. Kováts, Budapest 2013, p. 25.
63 Declaration of the European Ministerial Conference on Integration (Zaragoza, 15 & 16 April 2010), 
available at: https://ec.europa.eu/migrant-integration/librarydoc/declaration-of-the-european-ministerial-
conference-on-integration-zaragoza-15-16-april-2010 [accessed: 25.02.2017].
64 A. Kováts, op. cit., p. 26.
65 A research group founded within the Hungarian Central Statistical Office that became an inde- 
pendent institute in 1968.
66 Targeted survey conducted by the Hungarian Demographic Research Institute in 2002.
67 Ibidem.
68 Bevándorlók Magyarországon, “Az MTA Etnikai-nemzeti Kisebbségkutató Intézet és az ICCR 
Budapest Alapítvány által végzett kutatás zárótanulmányai”, 2009, available at: http://www.solidalapok.
hu/solid/sites/default/files/mtaki_iccr_bevandorlok_magyarorszagon.pdf [accessed: 3.03.2017].
69 A. Örkény, M. Székelyi, “Az idegen Magyarország”, 2009, [in:] “Bevándorlók Magyarországon, 
Budapest”, available at: http://www.solidalapok.hu/solid/sites/default/files/mtaki_iccr_bevandorlok_ma 
gyarorszagon.pdf [accessed: 25.03.2017].
109
ferent group of migrants (ethnic Hungarians from the Transcarpathian region 
in Ukraine, Ukrainians, Chinese, Vietnamese, Turkish and Arab respondents) 
and aimed at identifying different integration strategies among the migrant 
groups themselves. When the survey was conducted, the average time spent 
in Hungary was 14 years among the Vietnamese respondents, 10 years among 
the Chinese, 9 years in the case of Transcarpathian Hungarians, Ukrainians 
and Arabs and the Turkish respondents.70 Regarding the motivational factors 
behind their migration to Hungary two third of the respondents named family 
(or acquaintances) as the main reason, paired with favourable information about 
Hungary prior to the migration.71 According to the survey the educational level 
among the respondents was quite high; 52% held a degree and 39% was in Hun-
gary due to enrolment in higher education, hence, presumably they would, after 
some time, receive qualifications from an institution for higher education.72
With regard to the de facto employment rate and labour market activity, the 
authors of the study highlighted that the success of this integration is not pu-
rely to be measured by the existence of a position, but also by the assessment 
whether the position in the country of destination is similar to the position 
held in the country of origin. A clearly positive trend was visible among the re-
spondents: more than the half (54%) had a position similar to the one in the 
home country, while 20% held a better position.73
From the point of societal integration language skills are tremendously im-
portant, as language represents the bridge between the host society and the mi-
grants. With regard to the migrants’ Hungarian language skills the survey sho-
wed an interesting variation among the non-ethnic Hungarian groups (who 
self-evidently spoke the language already prior to their migration). Half of the 
Ukrainian respondents spoke Hungarian, while one third of the Vietnamese, 
Chinese and Turkish respondents claimed to have a good conduct of the lan-
guage (see, figure 2.4 below). There was, however, a group representing around 
20% each among the Turkish, Arab and Chinese respondent who claimed to 
have no knowledge of the Hungarian language and who did not wish to im-
prove their skills either.74 The attitude in relation to learning the language of 
the host society inevitably has an impact on the integration strategies developed 
by the different groups of migrants.
70 Ibidem, p. 86.
71 Ibidem, p. 87.
72 Ibidem, p. 90.
73 Ibidem, p. 91.
74 Ibidem, p. 95.
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70 Ibidem, p. 86.
71 Ibidem, p. 87.
72 Ibidem, p. 90.
73 Ibidem, p. 91.
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Figure 2.4
Language Skills among Migrants in Hungary in 2009
Source: A. Örkény, M. Székelyi, “Az idegen Magyarország”, 2009, [in:] “Bevándorlók Magyaror-
szágon, Budapest”, available at: http://www.solidalapok.hu/solid/sites/default/files/mtaki_iccr_be-
vandorlok_magyarorszagon.pdf [accessed: 25.03.2017].
Regarding the relation toward the members of the host society the vast 
majority of the respondent groups claimed to accept Hungarians minimum 
as friends. Almost all respondents from the Transcarpathian Hungarians the 
Ukrainian groups claimed that they would not mind a Hungarian family mem-
ber, but in this regard the Chinese and Vietnamese were much more hesitant. 
A group of 4% among the Chinese claimed not even wish to have Hungarians 
as their neighbours, while 13% of the Vietnamese claimed to accept Hunga-
rians as neighbours at the most. Two third of the Turkish respondents claimed 
that they would not mind Hungarian family members, while the outcome was 
around 50% among the Arab respondents.75
2.2.4.2. Migrant and State Strategies towards Integration
Upon arrival in the host country migrants have several paths to choose from 
regarding their own integration.76 One strategy may be the one of learning 
the language, entering the labour market, making an effort to integrate into 
the host society and – eventually – applying for a citizenship in order to stay 
permanently in the new country of residence. Another strategy may be the one 
of finding a resort among the own community, not to learn the language of the 
host society and to live rather segregated. A third strategy is the one of transna-
tional integration, entailing the capability to adapt to local conditions as well 
as to maintain close ties and networks to the country of origin, but where the 
75 Ibidem, p. 105.
76 Ibidem, p. 116.
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possibility to increase the economic gain is one of the leading goals in choosing 
further migrant routes.77
Among the above mentioned six groups of migrants in Hungary investiga-
ted in the study, the patterns regarding the integration strategies are quite cle-
ar: the majority of the ethnic Hungarians chose the first, assimilative strategy, 
while the majority of the Chinese, Turkish and Vietnamese migrants chose the 
strategy of segregation. The Arab group was special in a sense that the majority 
of the respondents arrived as students during the years of Socialism, hence, the-
ir integration commenced already as young students. Many of them are high-
ly educated, chose Hungarian life companions and learnt the language during 
the course of their studies. Hence, a relative majority of the Arab respondents 
claimed to follow the assimilative strategy. A relative majority of the Ukrainian 
respondents rather claimed to follow the transnational migrant paths, with the 
expected economic profit guiding the next steps.78 It has also been a known is-
sue for quite some time that primarily the Chinese and Vietnamese groups only 
apply a seemingly assimilative approach in the case of bogus marriages, which 
poses a great challenge to law enforcement in deciding the true intent behind 
fatherhood declarations regarding Hungarian children made by the members 
of these groups.79 The real intent behind the mentioned fatherhood declara-
tions is in fact to obtain permanent residency in Hungary.
Regarding national policies of integration a national strategy of migration 
entered into force in 2013,80 which foresaw the possibility of establishing a na-
tional strategy for integration as well. This, however, has not yet been drafted 
by the competent decision-makers.
2.2.4.3. The Hungarian Law on Asylum
After the brief overview of the situation of some migrant groups in Hunga-
ry, the group of refugees should also be examined accordingly. As a first step, 
the legal environment needs to be considered, which, in this case is the Hunga-
rian Law on Asylum. According to the Law on Asylum in force, the same rights 
77 Ibidem.
78 Ibidem, p. 120.
79 Hungary’s contribution to the European Migration Network in 2012 on the subject of abusement 
of residence permit with family purpose, available (only in Hungarian) at: https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/
sites/homeaffairs/files/what-we-do/networks/european_migration_network/reports/docs/emn-studies/
family-reunification/hu_20120606_familyreunification_hu_version_final_hu.pdf [accessed: 25.03.2017].
80 Az 1698/2013. (X. 4.) Korm. határozattal elfogadott Migrációs Stratégia és az azon alapuló, az 
Európai Unió által a 2014–2020 ciklusban létrehozásra kerülő Menekültügyi és Migrációs Alaphoz 
kapcsolódó hétéves stratégiai tervdokumentum, available at: http://belugyialapok.hu/alapok/sites/default/
files/MMIA.pdf [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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and obligations apply to persons granted international protection as to Hun-
garian citizens – unless there are provisions expressly excluding them. Some 
exceptions apply to the former category: they only have the right to vote at mu-
nicipal elections and local referendums, and are not entitled to work at jobs, 
offices or in functions for which Hungarian citizenship is required by law.81 
In practice, labour market integration, housing and access to social security be-
nefits to persons granted international protection is difficult, partly due to the 
lack of language knowledge (and limited access to language training), partly 
due to the lack of previous jobseeker’s allowance. Persons granted international 
protection (refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, and temporary pro-
tected persons) may stay in the reception centre for up to two months from the 
date their recognition becomes final.82
The latest modifications of the Law on Asylum entered into force in June 
2016 set forth the following provisions: the refugee status as well as the subsi-
diary protection is to be reviewed every three years, the legislature can order sta-
tus review in case of extradition of refugees is sought, the period of stay at the 
reception centre is to be reduced from 60 to 30 days, the housing subsidies are 
to be abolished for those granted international protection, schooling support to 
children, and neither asylum seekers, nor those granted protection will receive 
pocket money (normally HUF 2,850 per month).83 In connection to the mo-
dification of the Law of Asylum NGOs had the possibility to express opinions 
in March 2016 through a public consultation.
Regarding children the Hungarian law on education provides instant ac-
cess to the schooling system regardless of the status of the child. The number 
of children with migrant backgrounds in the educational institutions is quite 
low, however, the ones who attend public education institutions receive inte-
grated education in accordance with European and Hungarian laws.
Regarding the recognition of qualifications, it is possible to recognise di-
plomas and other qualifications obtained abroad, but for this the physical do-
cumentation has to be provided, referencing it is not enough. To facilitate this 
process, Hungary has long provided the possibility for the recognition of edu-
cational and professional qualifications through the Equivalence and Informa-
tion Center, which is a governmental agency.
81 10§ of the Law on Asylum, available at: http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0700080.TV 
[accessed: 25.02.2017].
82 Section 32-32/B of the Law on Asylum, and Governmental Decree Nr. 301 of 2007 (9 No- 
vember) on implementation of the Law on Asylum, available at: http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.
cgi?docid=A0700301.KOR [accessed: 25.02.2017].
83 See Sections 56–72 of the new concept, available at: http://www.kormany.hu/download/6/54/
a0000/Tervezet.pdf#!DocumentBrowse [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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2.2.4.4. Social Integration of Refugees and Persons Entitled to International 
Protection in Practice
As already mentioned before, there are several practical circumstances that 
make social integration difficult for persons granted international protection, 
and the recent legislative efforts foreshadow an even darker future for them. 
In absence of relevant statistical summary, the exact number of persons granted 
international protection residing in Hungary cannot be established. However, it 
is a known practice, that those granted international protection often leave the 
country shortly after their recognition – also with the help of already saved-up 
sums of earlier received state benefits – in order to join their family members, 
compatriots in other Western or Northern European countries with better in-
tegration prospects. 
2.3. Public Attitude 
(Sándor Gallai)
In 2015 the migration issue dominated the European political agenda.84 
That was the first time in the European Union when a non-economic issue was 
put on the first place of the list of top problems at EU level. More than half of 
the all respondents (58%) mentioned immigration as the top problem, while 
the second-placed terrorism was “only” mentioned by every fourth. It was also 
seen by 68% of the Hungarian respondents as the primary problem of the EU. 
The Hungarians also ranked immigration as a top national problem (together 
with unemployment). The perception of immigrants was heavily influenced 
by their origin: while the relative majority (49%) of Hungarians felt positive 
about the immigration of people from other EU member states, 82% (one of 
the highest among all member states) had a negative feeling about the immi-
gration of people from outside the European Union. In terms of support for 
a common European policy on migration Hungary was not an exception: the 
majority (55%) supported the idea, however, this figure was closer to the lower 
end and the level of opposition (39%) was among the highest ones.
A year later the Eurobarometer survey85 still found immigration being 
the top problem at EU level, but this time it was only mentioned by 45% 
of  the respondents. Of those who saw immigration as the top problem of the EU, 
84 Https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2015/20151223_2_en [accessed: 25.02.2017]; 
the survey data see: http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurvey 
Detail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2098 [accessed: 25.02.2017].
85 Http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4493_en.htm [accessed: 25.02.2017]; for the detailed 
results see the survey report: http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/
getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2137 [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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and obligations apply to persons granted international protection as to Hun-
garian citizens – unless there are provisions expressly excluding them. Some 
exceptions apply to the former category: they only have the right to vote at mu-
nicipal elections and local referendums, and are not entitled to work at jobs, 
offices or in functions for which Hungarian citizenship is required by law.81 
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nefits to persons granted international protection is difficult, partly due to the 
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due to the lack of previous jobseeker’s allowance. Persons granted international 
protection (refugees, beneficiaries of subsidiary protection, and temporary pro-
tected persons) may stay in the reception centre for up to two months from the 
date their recognition becomes final.82
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reception centre is to be reduced from 60 to 30 days, the housing subsidies are 
to be abolished for those granted international protection, schooling support to 
children, and neither asylum seekers, nor those granted protection will receive 
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in March 2016 through a public consultation.
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of children with migrant backgrounds in the educational institutions is quite 
low, however, the ones who attend public education institutions receive inte-
grated education in accordance with European and Hungarian laws.
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81 10§ of the Law on Asylum, available at: http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.cgi?docid=A0700080.TV 
[accessed: 25.02.2017].
82 Section 32-32/B of the Law on Asylum, and Governmental Decree Nr. 301 of 2007 (9 No- 
vember) on implementation of the Law on Asylum, available at: http://net.jogtar.hu/jr/gen/hjegy_doc.
cgi?docid=A0700301.KOR [accessed: 25.02.2017].
83 See Sections 56–72 of the new concept, available at: http://www.kormany.hu/download/6/54/
a0000/Tervezet.pdf#!DocumentBrowse [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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2.2.4.4. Social Integration of Refugees and Persons Entitled to International 
Protection in Practice
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and the recent legislative efforts foreshadow an even darker future for them. 
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is a known practice, that those granted international protection often leave the 
country shortly after their recognition – also with the help of already saved-up 
sums of earlier received state benefits – in order to join their family members, 
compatriots in other Western or Northern European countries with better in-
tegration prospects. 
2.3. Public Attitude 
(Sándor Gallai)
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That was the first time in the European Union when a non-economic issue was 
put on the first place of the list of top problems at EU level. More than half of 
the all respondents (58%) mentioned immigration as the top problem, while 
the second-placed terrorism was “only” mentioned by every fourth. It was also 
seen by 68% of the Hungarian respondents as the primary problem of the EU. 
The Hungarians also ranked immigration as a top national problem (together 
with unemployment). The perception of immigrants was heavily influenced 
by their origin: while the relative majority (49%) of Hungarians felt positive 
about the immigration of people from other EU member states, 82% (one of 
the highest among all member states) had a negative feeling about the immi-
gration of people from outside the European Union. In terms of support for 
a common European policy on migration Hungary was not an exception: the 
majority (55%) supported the idea, however, this figure was closer to the lower 
end and the level of opposition (39%) was among the highest ones.
A year later the Eurobarometer survey85 still found immigration being 
the top problem at EU level, but this time it was only mentioned by 45% 
of  the respondents. Of those who saw immigration as the top problem of the EU, 
84 Https://ec.europa.eu/home-affairs/what-is-new/news/news/2015/20151223_2_en [accessed: 25.02.2017]; 
the survey data see: http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/getSurvey 
Detail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2098 [accessed: 25.02.2017].
85 Http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-16-4493_en.htm [accessed: 25.02.2017]; for the detailed 
results see the survey report: http://ec.europa.eu/COMMFrontOffice/publicopinion/index.cfm/Survey/
getSurveyDetail/instruments/STANDARD/surveyKy/2137 [accessed: 25.02.2017].
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the second highest score (65%) was reached in Hungary. Concerning the top 
national problems, 30% of the Hungarians named immigration on the first place 
which was the second highest score (behind health and social security, mentio-
ned by 33%). Compared to the previous year a much higher proportion (57%) 
of Hungarians reported to have a positive feeling about the immigration of people 
from other EU member states, while 81% (once again one of the highest) felt ne-
gatively about the immigration of people from outside the European Union.
The Project 28, an EU-wide survey conducted by Századvég Foundation in 
Q1 2016,86 revealed that 77% of the European citizens claimed that the EU 
performed poorly when handling the migration crisis. In Hungary 82% believe 
so. In the EU 83% agreed that the external borders should be protected more 
effectively; the corresponding figure in Hungary was 96%, the highest in the 
entire Union. Despite being critical of the EU, in every member states the ma-
jority of the people would be unwilling to sign a petition about leaving the EU. 
Altogether nearly two-thirds (64%) were against signing such a petition, whi-
le in Hungary 75% rejected signing. The rapid population growth of the Mu-
slims were seen by 36% of Europeans as a very serious threat to their continent 
and an additional 34% regarded it as a somewhat serious threat. In Hungary, 
on the other hand, 53% saw it a very serious threat and 35% categorized it as 
a somewhat serious threat to Europe. Although a resettlement quota system for 
distributing migrants to Europe was supported by 53% of the respondents, in 
Hungary the rejection of the quota was the highest (85%). Support for pro-
tecting the borders by fences against immigrants was at 41% in the EU, mean-
while 51% disapproved the border barriers. The level of backing the fences was 
the second highest in Hungary (79%). Illegal immigration was found a very 
serious problem by 49% in the EU and 35% in Hungary, while the figures for 
the answer of “somewhat serious problem” stood at 35% and 38%, respectively. 
Nearly two-thirds of Europeans believed that the influx of immigrants would 
increase crime (65%) and the risk of terrorism (65%), and change the culture 
and identity of the receiving country (63%). The approval rate of the equivalent 
statements was even higher in Hungary (85%, 84%, and 73%, respectively).
In 2016 the Migration Research Institute – in collaboration with Századvég 
Foundation – also conducted a series of public opinion polls in Hungary on 
various aspects of migration. As opposed to the usual samples of 1,000, we ge-
nerally reached out to at least 2,000 Hungarian adults for the polls.87 In the 
86 Http://project28.eu/ [accessed: 25.02.2017].
87 The only exception was the last survey, when 1001 adult citizens were interviewed. Each sample 
was representative regarding age, sex, education, and residence. The respondents were introduced to the 
115
first survey (May 2016), we tried to identify the main concerns of citizens, the-
ir willingness to receive immigrants, their views on the management of the mi-
gration crisis and those on sovereignty. Nearly two-thirds (63%) believed that 
the current wave of asylum seekers was dominated by economic migrants. Eve-
ry fourth (23%) respondents claimed to have personal experience with immi-
grants and they mostly (75%) reported negative experience and regarded mass 
immigration to Europe as a serious risk to public safety (72%). Most respon-
dents (78%) claimed to see a direct link between the immigration wave and 
the increasing number of terrorist actions. In their opinion (73%) the latter 
was also in connection with the integration difficulties of already settled immi-
grants. Because of the threats and the negative perceptions, nearly three-fourth 
of the respondents (73%) would oppose the opening of reception centers in 
their municipality, while one-fifth would condition it to local job creation and 
development. Humanitarian considerations were also important as three-fifths 
(61%) would accept real refugees to the extent possible, but – due to the lack 
of sufficient resources and to the fear of losing their job – economic migrants 
would be rejected (65%). The overwhelming majority regarded the decisions 
on the asylum (73%) and settlement of immigrants (79%) as part of the na-
tional competences, while – according to more than half of the citizens (56%) 
– the protection of the Schengen external borders should be dealt by EU or-
gans and a more effective border control would be needed (60%). An assistan-
ce by the army in the protection of the borders and the installment of physical 
barriers (fences) to stop the immigrants were broadly supported (by 87% and 
80%, respectively). The majority (75%) believed that the number of arriving 
migrants could be reduced by positive political and economic changes in their 
country of origin.
Our second survey (June 2016) partly focused on the origin of personal 
experience on migration, and partly on the possible solutions to irregular mi-
gration. Altogether 90% opposed the irregular arrival of migrants to Europe. 
In line with our first survey, nearly every fourth respondents (22%) claimed to 
have personal experience on irregular migrants gained either directly or from 
a close relative. Of those with personal experience, nearly three-fourth (74%) 
had a negative opinion on the migrants;88 three-fifth only met migrants by ac-
cident and 9% by being the victim of harassment or insults by immigrants; 
one-third communicated with them in person, two-thirds only had indirect 
impressions. The EU was mostly (59%) expected to guarantee strict border 
questionnaires by computer-assisted telephone interviewing (CATI-method). Within a +/-2.2% margin 
the results are equivalent with as if all Hungarian adults were interviewed.
88 This finding was in sharp contrast with a general conviction of and claim by left-wing politicians 
suggesting more positive views on immigrants in cases of personal contacts with them.
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control, but its proposal on a quota-based re-allocation mechanism was re-
jected by most respondents (71%). According to an overwhelming majority 
(90%), the reestablishment of peace and stability in the sending countries wo-
uld mean a real solution to the migration crisis. While the majority (56%) 
believed it was possibility to use financial aid to the sending and the transit co-
untries effectively, their bulk (86%, 48% of all respondents) assumed that it 
would only be possible under international monitoring. 55% agreed to the sta-
tement that Hungary should also give financial aid to the sending countries, 
so a slight majority was in favor of Hungarian efforts to be taken to ease the mi-
gration pressure on Europe.
In the third survey (July 2016) the economic impacts of migration were 
assessed differently: while a slight majority (56%) generally considered fore-
ign employees contributing positively to the economy of the receiving coun-
tries, 81% associated rather negative economic impacts to those who arrived 
with the recent waves of migration. The conditions of successful integration 
would include obedience with the laws (93%), employment (89%), engage-
ment in social affairs, accepting the local culture (84%) and learn the local 
language (81%). In the case of those arriving with the current wave of migra-
tion, seven of ten (69%) respondents did not see their integration possible in 
the short term (within 5 years); 45% of them named the lack of cooperation 
by the immigrants as the primary obstacle to successful integration. All other 
reasons were mentioned by a considerably lower share (1–15%) of the respon-
dents. Most people agreed that the failure of integration would increase social 
tensions (90%), result in parallel societies (74%), higher crime rate (89%) and 
stronger extremist groups (85%). A considerable majority of respondents cla-
imed that mass immigration would lead to the spread of both radical Islamist 
ideas (83%) and to higher support for extremist, open-to-violence, anti-im- 
migration groups (90%). 77% did not regard the immigrants as a solution to 
Europe’s demographic problems.
The fourth survey (September 2016) repeated the question about the sup-
port for a quota-base reallocation of the asylum seekers: the result was ne-
arly identical with the previous one since 72% opposed any such proposals. 
Three-fourth (78%) suspected organized criminal groups behind the European 
terrorist attacks and only one-tenth believed in lonely terrorists. The motiva-
tions were mostly found by the respondent in poverty (46%), discrimination 
(28%) and the misinterpretation of Islam (65%). The spread of radical Isla-
mist views could most effectively be stopped by the family (58%), the security 
services (55%), the teachers (45%), friends and acquaintances (45%), civic 
groups (44%), churches (43%) and social workers (30%). A slight majority 
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(51%) agree that in cases of serious crimes it is justifiable to revoke the citizen-
ship of the receiving country from immigrants with dual citizenship.
In the fifth survey (September 2016), which was conducted in the run up 
to the quota referendum, we asked the respondents about the main potential 
risks of illegal border crossing. The possibility of terrorist attacks was mentio-
ned by 28%, increasing crime rate was named by 26%, more frequent vio-
lence against women by 14%, the threat to the national culture and identi-
ty by 13% and the losses of jobs by 4%. Altogether it also meant that 7 out 
of 10 Hungarians reckoned with deterioration in public security. People were 
also asked about religious and cultural differences: 52% regarded Muslim re-
ligion and way of life incompatible with European and Hungarian ways of 
life. 32% answered “less compatible”, 9% chose “partly compatible”, and only 1% 
picked “fully compatible”. The niqab, hijab and burka were considered by 36% as 
natural products of Muslim religious and cultural traditions, while 59% regarded 
them as means of suppressing the women. Not surprisingly, 53% supported the idea 
of banning those garbs in Europe, but 39% would oppose such a notion. As to the 
possibility of the integration of immigrants into local societies and economies in Eu-
rope, 10% answered “more likely” in contrast with 81% responding “less likely”.
It is obvious from the public opinion figures that the Hungarian population 
has reluctant attitude towards immigrants and strong reservations against the 
immigration of people with markedly distinct cultural background. They tend 
to be more open to refugees, but regards the majority of asylum seekers as eco-
nomic migrants. The overwhelming majority is skeptical about the possibility 
of successfully integrating the immigrants who arrivedto Europe in the past few 
years. The Hungarian citizens would expect the immigrants to obey with our 
laws, work, respect the culture of the receiving society and learn its language. 
The influx of a large number of Muslim immigrants and their unsuccessful in-
tegration are generally regarded as security risks and hotbed for both religious 
and political extremism. The Hungarian public saw a direct link between mass 
immigration and the recent wave of terrorist attacks. Terrorist were not regar-
ded as lonely criminals, but rather as members of organized groups, which mi-
sinterpret the Islam and commit violence in Europe. Social integration would 
be an important factor in stopping of radicalization, however, the family of po-
tential terrorist could play the primary role in the prevention of extremism.
As opposed to general expectations, personal experience with immigrants 
does not result in higher support for migration; on the contrary, they tend to 
have rather negative opinion on the immigrants. While the Hungarians are cri-
tical about the operation of the European Union, they continue to support the 
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country’s membership in the Union, and would be glad to see more EU assi-
stance with effective border control. On the other hand, the majority would 
rather keep immigration policy and asylum decisions in national competences, 
and rejects any quota based reallocation mechanism among the member sta-
tes. At the same time, the bulk of Hungarians strongly support the deployment 
of physical border barriers to stop mass immigration, and consider internatio-
nal cooperation and aid offered to the sending countries as the best possible 
solution to the migration crisis. In addressing the stabilization of the crisis zo-
nes, the Hungarian citizens would like to see their own government also taking 
a share of financial assistance.
2.4. Political Implications 
(Sándor Gallai)
2.4.1. The Evolution of the Party System
By applying a multi-level nomination process and a high implicit threshold, 
the Hungarian electoral system89 – adopted in 1989 – effectively filtered the 
political contesters and kept the number of parliamentary parties relatively low. 
Every election ended up with the formation of only 4 to 6 parliamentary gro-
ups. Both the increasing concentration of votes for the main parties and the di-
sproportionality of the system (i.e. the overrepresentation of the winner of the 
majority component (the SMDs) of the electoral system and the underrepre-
sentation of the smaller parties in legislature) facilitated the formation of go-
vernments that could rely on stable parliamentary backing. The position of the 
governments was strengthened further by the introduction of the constructive 
vote of no-confidence (1990), an institution which presents a serious obstac-
le to the creation of an alternative majority in parliament. Taking those factors 
into account, it is not surprising – albeit quite exceptional in the region – that 
in Hungary’s post-communist political history there has been no need for an 
early election. It is therefore not an exaggeration to claim that after the regime 
change the Hungarian proved to be the most stable party system in the East 
Central European region.90 This was already demonstrated by the second free 
elections, since Hungary was the only country where the very same (six) par-
89 C. Tóth, “A magyar választási rendszer”, [in:] A magyar politikai rendszer – negyedszázad után, 
ed. A. Körösényi, 2015, http://politologia.tk.mta.hu/uploads/files/A_magyar_politikai_rendszer_-_negy 
edszazad_utan_nyomdai.pdf [accessed: 22.01.2017].
90 A. Körösényi, C. Tóth, G. Török, “A magyar politikai rendszer”, 2003, p. 191, www.tankonyvtar.
hu/hu/...a.../2011_0001_520_a_magyar_politikai_rendszer.pdf [accessed: 22.01.2017].
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ties, which had obtained seats in the first free election, re-entered parliament 
for a second term. In addition, the concentration of the party system led to the 
emergence of a quasi-bipartisan or more precisely a two-block structure91 cha-
racterized by a very low level of fragmentation and electoral volatility.92
The post-communist successor party, the Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP) 
was able to consolidate its position within a few years after the regime change 
and prevailed as the main actor on the left.93 By 1998 the leading position on 
the right was captured by Fidesz,94 a party which, between 1993 and 1995, had 
moved away from the liberal to the conservative camp. While in the 1990s the 
swings of the voters compared to previous elections suggested the existence of 
a very high proportion of the electorate with vague or with no party affiliation,95 
the confrontational policies of the first Fidesz-led government (1998–2002) 
strongly divided the population, and strengthened the voters’ commitment to 
the main parties. In both the 2002 and the 2006 elections the MSZP and Fi-
desz were each supported by more than 40% of the voters. Obtaining together 
4 out of every 5 votes meant such a high level of concentration in the party sys-
tem that it was legitimate to talk about the consolidation of a quasi-bipartisan 
structure. Under such circumstances the small parties were either bound to run 
together with a senior partner or they had to struggle hard to push their result 
over the 5% parliamentary threshold.96 As the electoral behavior and the voting 
patterns also contributed to the stability of the party system, leading experts and 
academics believed in the freezing of the consolidated structure.97
In contrast with the experiences of traditional two-party systems, the natu-
re of the contest between the MSZP and Fidesz was not centripetal, but cen-
trifugal.98 Therefore it was not surprising that the domestic political and moral 
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ties, which had obtained seats in the first free election, re-entered parliament 
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crisis of 200699 as well as the consequences of the severe economic situation100 
– aggravated by the international financial crisis of 2008 – had both undermi-
ned government stability and cracked the rigidity of the party system. The “cri-
tical election”101 of 2010 resulted in a considerable transformation of the politi-
cal landscape (Table 3.). On the one hand, the neck on neck race between the 
two main parties had come to an end: Fidesz won a landslide victory and eno-
ugh seats to hold control of the constitutional (2/3rd) majority, while the Socia-
list Party lost more than half of its former supporters and slipped into the posi-
tion of a middle-size party. On the other hand, the list of parliamentary parties 
had also changed markedly: two of the formerly important parties of political 
transition, the Hungarian Democratic Forum (MDF) and the Alliance of Free 
Democrats (SZDSZ), failed to pass the threshold and fell out of parliament, 
whereas two – relatively new – anti-establishment parties succeeded to win re-
presentation. In the campaign the radical, anti-Semitic and anti-Roma Jobbik 
party102 talked about a derailed regime change and called for the punishment 
of those who took part in it.103 The Politics Can Be Different (LMP) party cla-
imed to develop a non-ideological profile, nevertheless it had a markedly green 
program and an alternative leftist image.104
Between 2010 and 2014 the second Fidesz-led government used its su-
per majority in parliament rather extensively. Among other, the governmen-
tal enacted a new constitution (“Fundamental Law”)105 and modified several 
cardinal laws that were subject to qualified majority.106 Some legislative actions 
and the subsequent changes to institutions, policies and/or personnel provoked 
severe criticism not only among the domestic opposition but also at interna-
tional (European) level. The adoption of the Fundamental Law, the new media 
law, the mandatory retirement of older judges, the re-nationalization of the ca-
pital stocks of the mandatory pension funds, the curtailed competences of the 
99 Z. Enyedi, K. Benoit, “Kritikus választás 2010. A magyar pártrendszer átrendeződése a bal-jobb 
dimenzióban”, [in:] Z. Enyedi, B.F. Casal, op. cit., pp. 22–23.
100 L. György, J. Veress, “A 2010 utáni magyar gazdaságpolitikai modell”, Pénzügyi Szemle, 2016/3, 
pp. 374–375.
101 Z. Enyedi, K. Benoit, op. cit., p. 20.
102 N. Sitter, op. cit., pp. 48–49; A. Tóth, I. Grajczjár, “Válság, radikalizálódás és az újjászületés ígérete: 
a Jobbik útja a parlamentbe”, [in:] Z. Enyedi, B.F. Casal, op. cit., pp. 59–60.
103 Https://jobbik.hu/rovatok/jobbik_aktualis/20_evet_a_20_evert_-_megjelent_a_barkad_hetilap_
legujabb_szama [accessed: 4.05.2010].
104 N. Sitter, op. cit., p. 49.
105 The communist constitution of 1949 had been modified heavily in 1989–1990, but – despite 
the reference in the new preamble – it was not replaced until as late as January 1, 2012 leaving Hungary 
to be the last among the post-communist CEE countries to adopt a new basic law.
106 While the modification of the constitution requires the support of 2/3rd of all MPs, the cardinal 
laws can be modified by 2/3rd of those present.
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Constitutional Court, the act on Churches, the changes to the electoral system, 
the revoking of some municipal competences, the sectoral surtaxes and the re-
duction of the public utility prices received particularly strong foreign criticism 
and contributed to the international isolation of the Hungarian government.107 
The policies of the government also divided the Hungarian public and – toge-
ther with the consequences of the economic crisis – undermined the populari-
ty of the government. Economic hardships were indicated by the high deficit 
of the general government balance and the EU’s Excessive Deficit Procedure 
against Hungary; serious indebtedness, FX loan crisis and weakening national 
currency; downgrading the government bonds by the international rating com-
panies into the “junk” category; the rapidly growing share of non-performing 
loans and freezing credit markets; the lack of private investments, sluggish con-
sumption as well as economic contraction with two waves of recession.
Table 2.3
The Results of the 2010 Parliamentary Elections
Party
Share of votes 
cast for the 
territorial 
party lists
No. of seats won 
in SMDs
No. of seats 
obtained from 
the national 
party list
No. (and 
proportion) 
of parliamentary 
seats won 
by the party
Fidesz-KDNP* 52.7% 173 3 263 (68.1%)
MSZP 19.3% 2 29 59 (15.3%)
Jobbik 16.7% 0 21 47 (12.2%)
LMP 7.5% 0 11 16 (4.1%)
MDF 2.7% 0 0 0 (0.0%)
Other parties, 
independents 1.2% 1** 0 1 (0.3%)
* Fidesz set up a joint electoral list and had joint candidates with the small Christian 
Democratic People’s Party (KDNP).
** The seat was obtained by an independent candidate.
Source: National Election Office, http://www.valasztas.hu/en/parval2010/298/298_0_
index.html [accessed: 10.03.2017].
Despite all those conflicts and difficulties, by 2014, the next parliamentary 
elections, the governing Fidesz was able to regain its earlier popularity. The par-
ty certainly benefited from the heterogeneity and the fragmentation of the left. 
However, according to polling agencies, it was the considerable reduction of 
the public utility prices – introduced in three different phases ahead of the elec-
tions – which proved to be vital in driving many of the previously disappointed 
107 Non-legislative issues, like Hungary’s relations with Russia or PM Orbán’s speech on – among 
other things – illiberal democracy, also led to harsh criticism.
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Fidesz voters back to the party’s camp.108 This was enough for the incum-
bent governing forces to repeat their electoral success of 2010, and they win 
a constitutional majority109 again (Table 2.4). The elections were held under 
a new electoral system,110 which had been adopted in 2011 with the support 
of the government MPs. Given the central position of and the single largest 
support for Fidesz, the party could have won the elections under the previous 
electoral system as well. Nevertheless, some elements of the new electoral law 
definitely favored Fidesz and added to its victory.111
Table 2.4
The Results of the 2014 Parliamentary Elections
Party
Share of votes 
cast for the 
national 
party list
No. of seats 
obtained from 
the national 
party list
No. of seats won 
in SMDs
No. (and 
proportion) 
of parliamentary 
seats won 
by the party
Fidesz-KDNP* 44.9% 37 96 133 (66.8%)
MSZP-Együtt-
DK-PM-MLP** 25.7% 28 10 38 (19.1%)
Jobbik 20.2% 23 0 23 (11.6%)
LMP 5.3% 5 0 5 (2.5%)
Other parties, 
minorities 3.9% 0 0 0 (0.0%)
* Fidesz again set up a joint electoral list and had jointly supported candidates with the 
Christian Democrats.
** The Socialists (MSZP) presented a joint electoral list together with “Together” 
(Együtt, the party of the outgoing prime mister of 2009–2010), Democratic Coalition 
(DK, a splinter party of the MSZP), Dialogue for Hungary (PM, a splinter of the LMP) 
and the Hungarian Liberal Party (MLP).
Source: National Election Office, http://www.valasztas.hu//en/ogyv2014/416/416_0_
index.html [accessed: 10.03.2017].
108 Http://www.origo.hu/itthon/20140107-honnan-szerzett-a-fidesz-egymillio-szavazot-egy-ev-alatt.
htm [accessed: 7.01.2017].
109 It did not last long though as it was lost in a by-election 10 months later (https://veol.hu/hirek/
veszpremi-idokozi-valasztas-1680827 [accessed: 10.03.2017]).
110 C. Tóth, op. cit., pp. 240–245.
111 The easier nomination requirements (i.e. the more contesters), the relative majority (plurality) 
in the SMDs, the higher proportion of SMD seats, the more limited compensation after the losing 
candidates and the winner’s bonus (also called compensation) generally help the most supported party, 
while redistricting and the suffrage of Hungarian citizens living in the neighboring countries favored Fidesz 
rather directly. The single round put pressure on the opposition parties to agree on cooperation before 
the elections (and not between the two rounds) also played into Fidesz’s hands because the opposition 
was heterogeneous and their joint list included the least popular politician, a former Socialist PM and the 
current head of Democratic Coalition (DK) party.
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The 2014 elections confirmed that the key features of the new party sys-
tem could be best captured by the dominant position of Fidesz (supported by 
45–50% of the active electorate), the apparently better electoral embeddedness 
of the political right (as Jobbik, Fidesz’s opposition on the right, was able to 
catch up with the Socialists, the largest party on the left),112 and the fragmenta-
tion and the permanent crisis of the left (characterized by an increasing num-
ber of splinter groups and new parties, while losing nearly 2/3rd of its former 
voters).113 And whereas in other European party systems of free elections the 
dominant parties often monopolize their political side, in the post-2009 Hun-
garian structure Fidesz occupies a “central” position in the sense that it faces 
opposition from both the left and the right.114
After the parliamentary election of 2014 the popularity of the governing 
Fidesz started to decrease. However, in contrast with earlier parliamentary 
terms, this time the popularity losses of the governing side were not accom-
panied by the increase of the support for the opposition parties.115 Moreover, 
a year later, Fidesz was able to stop the trend of decreasing popularity and the 
stabilization of public support for the party was – to a great extent – the result 
of its firm stance on immigration and its response to the migration crisis.
2.4.2. Party Positions on Immigration
Until mid-2015 the issue of mass migration was not high on the politi-
cal agenda. Although the first waves of migration reached Hungary half a year 
earlier, that earlier flow mostly consisted of economic migrants from Kosovo. 
Despite some sporadic warning voices, neither the government, nor the main 
opposition parties seemed to worry about the rising number of immigrants 
or the growing share of Asian and African migrants. The first marked exception 
was the coverage of an interview by the prime minister, in which he criticized 
economic migration and expressed Hungary’s preference for halting the influx 
of culturally strikingly different immigrants to Europe.116 While this interview 
112 The losses occurred since 2006 and contributed to the sinking of the left into a permanent crisis, 
C. Tóth, G. Török, “Az új pártrendszer”, [in:] Társadalmi Riport 2014..., pp. 515, 526–529.
113 The Socialist Party was considerably weakened by the departure of its former prime minister 
Ferenc Gyurcsány, who formed a new party called Democratic Coalition. LMP also suffered losses due 
to the departure of some of its MPs who established the party of Dialogue for Hungary (PM). The left 
was further divided by the emergence of other small parties (e.g. together, a party founded by another 
former prime minister, Gordon Bajnai; the Hungarian Liberal Party [MPL], headed by Gábor Fodor, 
an ex-member of Fidesz and SZDSZ).
114 Ibidem, p. 518.
115 Ibidem, pp. 516–517.
116 The interview was made in Paris at the commemoration of the victims of the terrorist attack 
against Charlie Hebdo, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/hirek/a-gazdasagi-bevandorlast-meg 
-kell-allitani [accessed: 20.11.2016].
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The 2014 elections confirmed that the key features of the new party sys-
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112 The losses occurred since 2006 and contributed to the sinking of the left into a permanent crisis, 
C. Tóth, G. Török, “Az új pártrendszer”, [in:] Társadalmi Riport 2014..., pp. 515, 526–529.
113 The Socialist Party was considerably weakened by the departure of its former prime minister 
Ferenc Gyurcsány, who formed a new party called Democratic Coalition. LMP also suffered losses due 
to the departure of some of its MPs who established the party of Dialogue for Hungary (PM). The left 
was further divided by the emergence of other small parties (e.g. together, a party founded by another 
former prime minister, Gordon Bajnai; the Hungarian Liberal Party [MPL], headed by Gábor Fodor, 
an ex-member of Fidesz and SZDSZ).
114 Ibidem, p. 518.
115 Ibidem, pp. 516–517.
116 The interview was made in Paris at the commemoration of the victims of the terrorist attack 
against Charlie Hebdo, http://www.kormany.hu/hu/a-miniszterelnok/hirek/a-gazdasagi-bevandorlast-meg 
-kell-allitani [accessed: 20.11.2016].
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was not followed by actual governmental steps, one month later, in February 
2015, parliament held a special session debating immigration and in May and 
June the government run an awareness campaign in forms of a national con-
sultation survey and giant billboard posters. Both the survey117 and the giant 
posters suggested that the immigrants pose a threat to the jobs, culture and se-
curity of the Hungarian citizens. The opposition criticized the government for 
conducting a xenophobic campaign, spending public money on such adverti-
sements and generating ungrounded fear in the Hungarian citizens.
In the summer of 2015, when the government made the first decisions on 
tackling the rapidly increasing number of irregular migrants and minimizing 
illegal border-crossings, the political discourse shifted more to the appropriate-
ness of the governmental responses to the crisis, the need for national policies, 
the treatment of migrants, the acceptability of EU decisions and the govern-
ment’s willingness to take part in the formulation of joint EU policies. The po-
litical parties on the right consistently used the terms “migrants” and “immi-
grants”. They emphasized the security risks that mass migration presented and 
also stressed the right of the national governments to turn back economic mi-
grants. In their opinion mass migration was a severe threat to European cultures 
and civilization. They were rather negative on the EU responses to the crisis and 
advocated the adoption of effective measures at national level. The parties on 
the left, on the other hand, persistently called the arriving migrants “refugees” 
or “asylum-seekers”. They tended to underline that governmental responses 
should be given in line with Hungary’s legal and humanitarian obligations, but 
they also emphasized the need for joint European migration policy.118
2.4.2.1. Fidesz
From the beginning of the migration crisis Fidesz119 persistently opposed 
mass immigration. The MPs of the party were critical of the influx of “cultural-
ly different” people, whose integration proved to be a failure in most Western 
societies. Their mass immigration was seen as a threat to both European securi-
ty and civilization. In their view demographic problems and the shortage of la-
117 The government’s national survey on migration ended up with 1.1 million questionnaires filled in and 
returned. For each question 90–95% of the answers were in line with the position of the government.
118 We reconstructed the party positions on migration from the parliamentary debates of the respective 
laws. The records were taken from the website of the Assembly (http://www.parlament.hu/orszaggyulesi-
naplo and http://www.parlament.hu/ulesnap-felszolalasai [accessed: 5.01.2017]).
119 The government is formally backed by a coalition of two parties. Here we write about Fidesz, 
the senior governing party, since its junior partner, the Christian Democratic People’s Party (KDNP) has 
no measurable public support on its own. It was also evident from   the parliamentary records that in the 
area of migration the MPs of KDNP did not express any considerably different views from that of Fidesz.
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bor should not and cannot be solved by mass immigration as – in contrast with 
earlier waves – the current influx was dominated by under- and uneducated pe-
ople. The Fidesz deputies insisted on the need to differentiate between refugees, 
who are forced to flee their country by humanitarian necessity, and economic 
migrants. Fidesz blamed the aggressive export of democracy, the abuse of asy-
lum, the failure of EU policies and the irresponsible promises taken by some 
national (most notably German) and European leaders for the massive migra-
tion crisis of 2015–2016.
The party repeatedly warned about the serious public health and security 
risks that irregular mass migration presented. The terrorist attacks in Paris and 
Brussels were interpreted by Fidesz representatives as sheer evidence of connec-
tions among mass immigration, illegal border crossing and terrorism. While 
they demanded a proper response to the crisis from the European Union, they 
also expressed their opposition to the transfer of further competences to Brus-
sels. Fidesz deputies emphasized that migration policy was in the competences 
of member states. The standing European and international regulations on asy-
lum were seen inadequate to tackle the migration crisis. The Geneva Conven-
tion was the product of the cold war and did not reckon with large-scale migra-
tion. Nor did the Dublin Regulation, which was properly fit for normal times, 
but put extreme burdens on the border countries from the moment when 
the number of immigrants started rocketing. Despite the acknowledgement of 
the serious challenges irregular migration presented for the Schengen border 
countries, the Fidesz MPs regularly blamed Greece for failing to meet its Euro-
pean legal obligations and – by doing so – catalyzing the systemic abuse of asy-
lum regulations by immigrants. Some deputies even suggested that the country 
deliberately stopped to comply with the Schengen rules to avoid the return of 
trespassing migrants. Indeed, the European Court of Human Rights declared 
that – by not fulfilling its international duties and allocating not enough reso-
urces for asylum assessment procedures – Greece should not be regarded as a 
safe country, consequently no asylum-seeker shall be transported to Greece for 
Dublin take back. According to the MPs of the governing party, migrants in 
great numbers abuse this situation and they are assisted by human smugglers 
in their attempts to get to the territory of the European Union.
The deputies of Fidesz stressed that – under the Geneva Convention – asy-
lum seekers would be obliged to cooperate with the authorities. Subsequently, 
they should have submitted their claim for protection upon their arrival at an 
official border crossing point, accepted their place in a reception center and 
waited there till the decision on their case would have been made. As opposed 
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to that, most of the immigrants did not arrive to the crossing points, but 
rather tried to sneak in at the green border; they had no legal documents; 
they submitted their asylum claim only when caught by the authorities; and 
they did not wait for the assessment, but left the country within days and he-
aded to the West – although requesting international protection do not entitle 
the claimants to cross the internal borders of the European Union.
The representatives of Fidesz reminded that Hungary had altogether spent 
HUF 1.1 bn in 2012, 1.8 bn in 2013 and 2.6 bn in 2014 on immigrants. 
In 2014 – when out of 42,700 asylum claims only 280 requests were approved 
and the average stay of an immigrant in Hungary before leaving for the We-
stern member states was not longer than 3 days – the direct costs of immigra-
tion benefits120 reached HUF 1.5 bn since each illegal immigrant was entitled 
for a daily allowance of HUF 4,300. While expressing their sympathy and so-
lidarity, the Fidesz MPs stated that such expenditures could not be increased 
beyond a certain level and illegal migrants should not undermine the financial 
security of the country. In light of such concerns it is not surprising that the go-
verning deputies later supported the curtailing of refugee benefits. They argued 
that the immigrants arriving to Hungary and those under international pro-
tection should not receive more subsidies than a Hungarian citizen could get. 
They agreed to the termination of the integration contracts and to the elimina-
tion of subsidies unavailable to Hungarian citizens (per diem, accommodation 
and schooling subsidies). At the same time they also voted for the reductionof 
the time – from 2 to 1 month – a refugee might spend in a reception center, 
while – due to the early departure of most claimants to the West – they did not 
undertake any proposals to expand the capacities of the reception centers. On 
the other hand, they supported legal changes that aimed at speeding up the in-
vestigating procedure of the rightfulness of international protection claims.
The Fidesz MPs emphasized that immigrants should only cross the borders 
at official entry points. They stressed that it was an obligation of the Hungary 
authorities to prevent illegal border crossing and take actions against those who 
violated the respective regulations. They talked about the conflicting expecta-
tions of the European Union, which wanted Hungary to prevent the free flow 
of migrants to Western member states, while also refrain from the detention 
of immigrants even though the bulk of them wish to go further to richer coun-
tries. The Fidesz deputies referred to a “dual pressure”. On the one hand, the 
Southern (Schengen) borders were under a strong pressure from masses of im-
migrants who demanded free entry to Hungary and unrestricted transit to the-
ir most favored destination. On the other hand, the temporary reintroduction 
120 I.e. policing, registration and other bureaucratic expenditures excluded.
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of (internal) border control by Germany and Austria also presented a serious 
risk to Hungary with the possibility of the Schengen return of all those immi-
grants, who had been registered at the Hungarian borders.
The Fidesz MPs claimed that under such pressure the country had no other 
option but to establish physical and legal border barriers. They argued that the 
fence was erected to meet a legal obligation since effective border control was 
stipulated by the Schengen agreement as well. They added that – by guarding 
the external Schengen borders effectively – Hungary also defended one of the 
fundamental rights of EU citizens. The lack of control at the internal borders 
was essential for the free movement of people. Therefore that Fidesz deputies 
stated that failing to guard the boards properly would entail the re-introduction 
of internal border control and would thus go against the interests of all member 
states. They reminded the opponents of physical border barriers that building 
a fence was not without precedent in the EU since similar solutions had been 
in place in Spain and Bulgaria, where the erected barriers reduced the number 
of illegal border-crossings to 1/7th of the original. The MP’s of the governing 
side also agreed to the deployment of more personnel to the borders, to the im-
position of stricter punishments against human smugglers as well as to the crimi-
nalization of illegal border crossing, the hindering of the construction of border 
barriers and their damaging. They stressed even more the need to differentiate 
the refugees from economic migrants and to seal the borders from the latter. 
For legally arriving asylum-seekers the government created transit zones, 
which was a decision yet again welcomed by the Fidesz MPs. In their view the 
fences were not meant to hinder legally arriving people to cross the borders, but 
to divert them towards the transit zones. They argued that the fences were also 
meant to be erected to demonstrate what was allowed and what was not. Cut-
ting and crossing the fences was possible, but illegal. For the sake of enforcing 
that legislation, the governing deputies approved to expand both the budget 
and the personnel of the Border Guard. However, they turned down all propo-
sals aiming at the separation of the Border Guard from the police.
The terrorist attacks carried out in Western Europe during the migration 
crisis made the security dimension of immigration ever more relevant. With 
the securitization of the migration issue the physical barriers at the border were 
portrayed as tools both to protect European families, life and culture, and to 
avoid the “import of terrorism”. The border barriers were generally assessed by 
the Fidesz MPs as part of a successful (albeit national-level) solution which had 
effectively reduced the number of illegal border-crossings. At the same time, 
the deputies also demanded to increase the capabilities of the security agen-
cies since the true identity and residence of hundreds of thousand immigrants 
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staying in the EU remained unknown to the authorities. Referring to the lack 
of an effective European filtering of potential terrorist from among the immi-
grants, the representatives of the governing party advocated national responses. 
As part of the national answers to the challenges they voted for the codifica-
tion of a special legal order (“state of emergency”) for crisis situations caused by 
mass immigration. It was pictured as the only solution for situations when pe-
acetime measures would no longer be sufficient, and whereas the limitations of 
human rights applied under already existing special legal orders would be unre-
asonably harsh. The MPs presented this solution as the only way to enable the 
government to respond to direct and immanent terror threats adequately, while 
also holding it back from the possibility of abusing powers available in special 
legal orders. They did not fail to mention that Salah Abdeslam, the organizer 
of the terrorist attacks in Paris, had picked up immigrant panders at the Eastern 
Railway Station of Budapest.121 In the light of such an obvious connection be-
tween illegal immigration and terror threat, the Fidesz deputies expressed their 
conviction that in some situations human rights had to give priority to security. 
Nevertheless, they claimed that the newly introduced measures, including the 
limits on human rights, had all existed in the West European legal systems and 
were neither exceptional, nor disproportionate.
The MPs of the ruling side also agreed to allow the government to issue 
a decree on the list of safe third countries. The Fidesz representatives supported 
the categorization of Bulgaria, Greece and Serbia as safe countries since each of 
the respective government had signed up to participate in all important inter-
national regimes and treaties protecting and assisting asylum seekers. The go-
verning politicians argued that those who arrived from safe countries should be 
denied of the right to seek international protection in Hungary as upon their 
return international they would not be threatened by direct or indirect refo-
ulement. The MPs warned that with such a government decree in effect, illegal 
border crossing from a safe country – even under provision 33 of the Geneva 
Convention – would be penalized.
In defense of national sovereignty, the MPs of the ruling Fidesz decided 
to back a law that aimed at demonstrating the support of parliament for the 
government to take legal action against the Council Decision on relocation 
121 This happened when the news of closing the borders pushed a large wave of immigrants to enter 
Hungary, but – on their way to Austria and Germany – they got stuck in Budapest and waited for days at the 
Eastern Railway Station (which got nicknamed as Middle-Eastern Railway Station, e.g. http://spartacuska.
blogspot.hu/2015/08/a-kozel-keleti-palyaudvar-es-magyar.html [accessed: 25.08.2015] or http://alfa 
hir.hu/kozel_keleti_palyaudvar_lett_a_keletibol [accessed: 25.08.2015]). The situation deteriorated 
further when German Chancellor Merkel announced to welcome all Syrian asylum-seekers without 
imposing an upper cap on their number (http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/710247/Angela-Merkel-
refuses-cap-migrants-number-demand-coalition-partners [accessed: 13.09.2015]).
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(no. 2015/1523) at the European Court. They regarded neither the content 
of the Decision, nor the way it had been adopted acceptable. In their view the 
national parliaments should have been consulted as the Council Decision mo-
dified an existing legislation, the Dublin III Regulation (604/2013), while the 
referred Article (78/3) could only have been used for non-legislating decisions. 
Being excluded from the legislative procedure, the national parliaments had 
had no chance to exercise their monitoring right provided by the Lisbon Treaty, 
so they could not challenge compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. Mo-
reover, the Fidesz deputies also complained about the Decision as it went aga-
inst the will of the European Council, which was expressed in June 2015 and 
stated that a relocation proposal should enjoy the support of all member states 
in the Council of Ministers. A further complaint against the Decision was esta-
blished on the Council’s failure to resend the proposal to the European Parlia-
ment, since in case of a considerably redrafted text it should have been a normal 
expectation. The MPs of the governing party had one more principal critique 
of the Decision: they shared the view that modern states had three attributes 
(territory, population and public power), and they believed that – as part of na-
tional sovereignty – a state should be free to decide on its inhabitants. Regar-
dless the outcome of the court case, they also warned about the impossibility 
of the implementation of such quota-based relocation and resettlement sche-
mes, since most migrants did not wish to stay in Eastern member states, but 
wanted to reach Germany, Denmark or Sweden.
The Council Decision on relocation was also viewed by the governing depu-
ties as the starting point for the establishment of a similar mechanism for fu-
ture allocation of immigrants among the EU member states. The Fidesz MPs 
strongly rejected the imposition of mandatory quotas on member state govern-
ments, they were only willing to support quota regimes based on the volunta-
ry participation of receiving countries. Nevertheless, a quota scheme without 
a cap was also against their opinion since it would generate flows of migrants 
leaving for Europe. In their opinion reception camps should be established out-
side the territory of the European Union, where the migrants shall wait till the 
end of the assessment of their claim. Then those eligible for asylum should be 
allowed to enter the EU along the lines and numbers of voluntary quotas, while 
the fate of economic migrants should be decided by individual member states 
who shall enjoy full freedom in their decision on openness.
The Fidesz deputies rejected all criticism of being xenophobic, and remin-
ded their opposition to the refugees from the Balkans – Serbs, Croats and Bo-
sniaks who escaped to and were assisted by Hungary at the time. The MPs also 
underlined the fundamental differences between the two situations: while at 
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121 This happened when the news of closing the borders pushed a large wave of immigrants to enter 
Hungary, but – on their way to Austria and Germany – they got stuck in Budapest and waited for days at the 
Eastern Railway Station (which got nicknamed as Middle-Eastern Railway Station, e.g. http://spartacuska.
blogspot.hu/2015/08/a-kozel-keleti-palyaudvar-es-magyar.html [accessed: 25.08.2015] or http://alfa 
hir.hu/kozel_keleti_palyaudvar_lett_a_keletibol [accessed: 25.08.2015]). The situation deteriorated 
further when German Chancellor Merkel announced to welcome all Syrian asylum-seekers without 
imposing an upper cap on their number (http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/710247/Angela-Merkel-
refuses-cap-migrants-number-demand-coalition-partners [accessed: 13.09.2015]).
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(no. 2015/1523) at the European Court. They regarded neither the content 
of the Decision, nor the way it had been adopted acceptable. In their view the 
national parliaments should have been consulted as the Council Decision mo-
dified an existing legislation, the Dublin III Regulation (604/2013), while the 
referred Article (78/3) could only have been used for non-legislating decisions. 
Being excluded from the legislative procedure, the national parliaments had 
had no chance to exercise their monitoring right provided by the Lisbon Treaty, 
so they could not challenge compliance with the principle of subsidiarity. Mo-
reover, the Fidesz deputies also complained about the Decision as it went aga-
inst the will of the European Council, which was expressed in June 2015 and 
stated that a relocation proposal should enjoy the support of all member states 
in the Council of Ministers. A further complaint against the Decision was esta-
blished on the Council’s failure to resend the proposal to the European Parlia-
ment, since in case of a considerably redrafted text it should have been a normal 
expectation. The MPs of the governing party had one more principal critique 
of the Decision: they shared the view that modern states had three attributes 
(territory, population and public power), and they believed that – as part of na-
tional sovereignty – a state should be free to decide on its inhabitants. Regar-
dless the outcome of the court case, they also warned about the impossibility 
of the implementation of such quota-based relocation and resettlement sche-
mes, since most migrants did not wish to stay in Eastern member states, but 
wanted to reach Germany, Denmark or Sweden.
The Council Decision on relocation was also viewed by the governing depu-
ties as the starting point for the establishment of a similar mechanism for fu-
ture allocation of immigrants among the EU member states. The Fidesz MPs 
strongly rejected the imposition of mandatory quotas on member state govern-
ments, they were only willing to support quota regimes based on the volunta-
ry participation of receiving countries. Nevertheless, a quota scheme without 
a cap was also against their opinion since it would generate flows of migrants 
leaving for Europe. In their opinion reception camps should be established out-
side the territory of the European Union, where the migrants shall wait till the 
end of the assessment of their claim. Then those eligible for asylum should be 
allowed to enter the EU along the lines and numbers of voluntary quotas, while 
the fate of economic migrants should be decided by individual member states 
who shall enjoy full freedom in their decision on openness.
The Fidesz deputies rejected all criticism of being xenophobic, and remin-
ded their opposition to the refugees from the Balkans – Serbs, Croats and Bo-
sniaks who escaped to and were assisted by Hungary at the time. The MPs also 
underlined the fundamental differences between the two situations: while at 
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that time the refugees were known to come for a temporary shelter and they 
fully cooperated with the local authorities, the migrants of the recent crisis were 
usually determined to stay in Europe, often refused to cooperate, and violated 
national and/or European regulations. The very same arguments were used by 
the Fidesz MPs when they dismissed any comparison between the current refu-
gees and the emigrants of the Hungarian revolution of 1956. They underlined 
that the Hungarian refugees had not faked their identity, accepted and follo-
wed the rules of their host country, and cooperated with the authorities. They 
also added that while the EU expects half a billion European citizens to respect 
the standing laws, the very same Union proved to be unable to get hundreds 
of thousand immigrants registered.
In response to opposition criticism of residence bonds, the MPs of the go-
verning Fidesz repeatedly stressed that such bonds were sold to foreign investors 
and businessmen who would not live on social subsidies and who should not be 
viewed as potential terrorists, since more than 90% of the buyers were Chinese 
and they were all subject to a screening process by the respective security servi-
ces which could also rely on advice from their European counterparts.
2.4.2.2. Jobbik
The deputies of Jobbik named the USA and the EU as the main causes 
of the migration crisis as the formerly colonizing practices, the collection of co-
lonial taxes, the recent US-led military actions in Asia and Africa as well as the 
European mismanagement of the challenges had all contributed to the erup-
tion and the aggravation of the crisis. Due to the extremely high number of mi-
grants, Jobbik talked about the “occupation of Europe”. While acknowledging 
the moral obligation to assist refugees, the party emphasized that assistance to 
them should only be temporary and that it should mean neither settlement, 
nor integration. At the same time, Jobbik also stressed the country’s right to 
decide on economic migrants independent of EU expectations. The party did 
not reckon with an effective European migration policy due to the diverging 
interests of the member states. The representatives of the party recalled Hunga-
ry’s historical fight against the former Ottoman empire, and blamed the West 
– defended by “Hungarian blood” and “taxpayers’ money” – for not giving any-
thing in return but the Trianon treaty, the “betrayal of the 1956 revolution”, 
“the default interests” on the government debt, and the stigma of “being racist 
and anti-Semitic”.
Although Jobbik saw the Hungarian demographic trends troublesome, but 
it rejected migration as a possible solution since it could end up with a situation 
in which Hungary would be “unable to preserve its identity” and one would 
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have “to fight for keeping Hungary in the hands of Hungarians”. The party re-
peatedly warned about the number of migrants arriving to Hungary surpassing 
the number of children born in the country.
Jobbik persistently demanded the adoption and the implementation of 
three measures to tackle the migration crisis at national level. Firstly, the party 
wanted to transform all existing reception centers into closed and guarded fa-
cilities to prevent the free movement of “people of unknown origin and iden-
tity”. It often referred to the reservations of local inhabitants and their protests 
against the behavior of refugees and the opening of further capacities. There-
fore, the party also called on the government to relocate the operating recep-
tion centers to outside the territory of towns and villages. Secondly, Jobbik also 
insisted on the re-establishment of the Border Guard as an organization inde-
pendent of the police. The party brought up the example of the other member 
states with Schengen external borders, where the Border Guard existed as sepa-
rate organization. Thirdly, Jobbik argued for returning all illegally arriving eco-
nomic migrants and expressed no willingness to subsidize those, “who arrived 
to Hungary without an invitation” as Hungary spent HUF 4,300 per day on 
each migrant, when the daily cost of supporting a Hungarian unemployed was 
HUF 2,000, and a migrant was fed for HUF 1,300 per day, when daily meals 
in inpatient care had to be covered from hardly more than HUF 500 per per-
son per day. The party concluded that despite humanitarian considerations, 
the Hungarian state could not afford to give assistance to migrants, therefore it 
came to no surprise that Jobbik supported the curtailing of subsidies to refugees. 
Jobbik also warned about the risk of an epidemic catastrophe because migrants 
arriving from crisis zones should undergo very serious health screening, but 
that would be impossible due to the extremely expensive processes. In the-
ir view the same stands for security screening, which – in the lack of enough 
resources – cannot be carried out for each single immigrant.
As to border control, the party reminded that the USA, “the cradle of hu-
man rights”, had erected a 310 km long fence at the Mexican border and au-
thorized the guards to use guns when necessary. In line with that Jobbik we-
lcomed both the building of physical border barriers and the expansion of the 
human capacities. It also agreed to the use of military assistance for the protec-
tion of the borders, but proposed the modification of the Fundamental Law to 
clarify the division of competences between the police and the army. The par-
ty opposed that Hungarian soldiers served in Afghanistan, Iraq and elsewhere 
abroad. Instead, the Jobbik MPs wanted to see them back to detain illegal im-
migrants at the Hungarian borders bearing in mind not only the difficulty to 
stop masses of unarmed migrants, but also the risks that the ongoing war in the 
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stop masses of unarmed migrants, but also the risks that the ongoing war in the 
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neighborhood might present. The deputies also worried about the composition 
of the arriving migrants as 80% of them were “young male of fighting age”. 
The MPs wanted to see a policy of zero tolerance based on the enabling of the 
police and the army to protect the borders “by all means” and resulting in no 
person allowed to cross the Hungarian borders illegally. In the lack of enough 
personnel, Jobbik would also accept the idea of a voluntary guard operating 
under state control at the borders. As the party proposed to expel all those mi-
grants from the country who were danger to public safety, it agreed to a corre-
sponding legislation submitted by the government.
The EU responses to the migration crisis were all rejected by the party. Job-
bik opposed the idea of mandatory quotas. Their interpretation of the propo-
sal was a critique addressed to the German government and the institutions: in 
their view, Berlin and Brussels pursued a mistaken immigration policy, which 
did not work, and the mandatory quotas were meant to spread the damages 
among the other EU states. The Jobbik MPs regarded the quota regime as equal 
to sending a letter of invitation to Asia and Africa with the promise of granting 
a new home to every immigrant who arrive to the EU. They believed that a qu-
ota system could not work because – due to the principle of the free movement 
of people – it would be impossible to detain the allocated migrants who wo-
uld wish to leave their designated place for their country of choice. Moreover, 
the quota would also mean a major security risk: they argued that – although 
not all immigrants were terrorists, but – the terrorists were all migrants, there-
fore if a country wanted to protect itself from terrorism, it also had to protect 
itself from immigration, hence it had to protect itself from the quotas as well. 
While Jobbik agreed to back the government to take legal actions against the 
mandatory relocation of migrants from Greece and Italy, it also advocated the 
formulation of a plan B for the situation where the court case would not stand. 
The party proposed to modify the Fundamental Law and hold a binding refe-
rendum on the quotas. Although its respective motion was turned down, a few 
month later, when the governing parties returned with a corresponding initia-
tive, Jobbik welcomed the proposal.
The party was also very critical of the Schengen return and labelled the Du-
blin Regulation inadequate for such crisis situations and particularly harmful 
for entry countries like Hungary. Under the current regulations the destination 
countries, such as Germany, will be in the position to do cherry picking: they 
can select the best qualified and most valuable immigrants and send back all 
those migrants whom they do not need. This leaves Hungary vulnerable against 
the Schengen return of potentially 170 thousand migrants who arrived to the 
Western member states in 2015 via Hungary. As the Dublin Regulation may 
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not be suspended and its modification is either impossible or rather time con-
suming, Jobbik called on the government to either stop the registration of mi-
grants heading to Germany and other more attractive EU member states or seal 
the borders and keep all immigrants out of the Hungarian territories. The par-
ty saw no other solution in a situation where Greece and Bulgaria violated EU 
laws by allowing refugees and other migrants to pass their territory, and Serbia, 
a country on the road to join the EU, provided the migrants with government 
assistance to reach the Hungarian border. As there were no sanctions against 
those who did not apply the Schengen rules, Italy and Greece refrained from 
the registration of immigrants. Jobbik argued for the same: as they expected the 
German policy of welcome to end up in the return of masses to the country 
of entry, they believed that registration was “a synonym for treason”. In their 
words: breaching regulations is bad, but registering the immigrants would be 
even worse; it will be a catastrophe when Germany starts to send back migrants 
in large numbers. The party insisted that the return of illegal migrants arriving 
to Hungary should be institutionalized and properly regulated. Instead of re-
gistering them, they should be returned to the country they had come from. 
Since the agreement between Hungary and Serbia only allowed the take-back 
of a limited number of migrants (maximum 30 people per day), Jobbik wanted 
to modify it and increase the cap to secure Hungary from the possible return of 
many registered asylum-seekers from Germany and Austria.
Jobbik deputies also wanted to close the other channel of migration to Hun-
gary, hence they demanded the government to stop “the residence bond busi-
ness” immediately. One the one hand, due to contracting out the sale of bonds 
to private companies, the scheme was not regarded as financially beneficial for 
Hungary. On the other hand, Jobbik expressed its doubts concerning the back-
ground and the credibility of the purchasers of residence bonds, and it conclu-
ded that neither the poor, nor the rich migrants should be allowed to come to 
Hungary. Jobbik also criticized the leftist and the liberal parties for supporting 
migration; refreshing the memory of a referendum held in December 2004, 
Jobbik labelled them as hypocrites for pressing the government for the inte-
gration of immigrants, while in 2004 they had campaigned “against their own 
brothers” when calling on the Hungarian electorate to vote against the citizen-
ship of Hungarians living in the neighboring countries.
2.4.2.3. Hungarian Socialist Party (MSZP)
The Socialists were strong supporters of finding EU-level solutions to the 
migration crisis and they wanted to see a joint asylum policy. The refugee cri-
sis was not caused by Hungary, hence the government could not solve it at na-
tional level. The Socialist deputies blamed the government for its pretended 
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respect for and actual violation of EU laws and values. In their opinion the term 
economic migrant was invented by Fidesz for the purpose of rabble-rousing. 
They viewed the government not so eager to solve the problems of migration, 
but rather acting deliberately for the escalation of the European crisis. Accor-
ding to the Socialists, the chaos at the Hungarian borders and at the Eastern 
Railway Station of Budapest was caused by neither Germany, nor the EU; 
it was the responsibility of Fidesz and Viktor Orbán personally. They called on 
the prime minister to give up his militant style and engage into negotiations 
seeking possible European and international solutions to the crisis. While ack-
nowledging large-scale immigration as a challenge for policy-makers, they re-
garded the emigration of hundreds of thousands Hungarians to Western coun-
tries as an equally serious problem.
The Socialists criticized the government for not responding the danger 
of mass migration in time. Although aware of the expected wave of migration, 
for half a year the government did not pass any laws, did not take any actions 
to prevent or tackle the crisis; it neither guaranteed the fundamental rights 
of immigrants, nor protected the security of Hungarian citizens. Instead, the 
government carried out an intensive negative campaign against migrants. 
The Socialist MPs stressed that as the expensive giant billboards were in Hun-
garian, the messages obviously did not address the immigrants; they were rather 
meant to stir racist and xenophobic sentiments in the Hungarian electorate. 
The Socialists also rejected the national survey on migration and condemned 
the government for spending HUF 1.3 bn of the taxpayers’ money on “a hatred 
campaign against the immigrants.” 
The MSZP criticized the governing parties for rejecting all proposals co-
ming from the opposition. The Socialists proposed to increase the budget of the 
Immigration Office considerably to make it better prepared for tackle a rapidly 
growing number of asylum claims. They also proposed to punish the human 
smugglers more severely. On the other hand, the Socialists opposed the intro-
duction of a new special legal order as they considered the standing regulations 
adequate and effective enough. Their deputies reminded the government that 
the illegal immigrants who arrived to Hungary without valid documents could 
be detained up until the end of their asylum procedure; moreover, those who 
leave the open reception centers without permission could be taken into custo-
dy. Therefore, the MSZP saw no need for an additional special legal order, but 
rather invited the police to do its duty. For that they supported the police get 
more funds for both the purchase of new technical equipment and the hiring 
of more personnel.
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The Socialist party did not support the deployment of physical border bar-
riers. It criticized the government for creating “a new iron curtain”. According 
to the Socialists, such national solutions could only result in further fences wi-
thin Europe and a fence at the Austrian-Hungarian border would be particular-
ly devastating given the daily border crossing by tens of thousands of Hunga-
rians who work in Austria. The MSZP emphasized the benefits of the principle 
of the free movement of people within the European Union and insisted 
on the implementation of policies that would not undermine this achievement 
of the integration. The Socialists saw the decision on the border barrier not 
only as a sign of the government’s preference for national responses, but also as 
an evidence for its incompetence. They reminded that in the summer of 2015 
the government announced its decision to erect a fence and close the border 
by fall, but the sluggish implementation offered quite a lot of time for masses 
of migrants to reach the Hungarian border and cross it before the actual de-
ployment of the physical barrier. The MSZP, in principle, agreed to the creation 
of transit zones and to the idea of conducting assessment procedures at the bor-
der, but it did not support the government initiative as it saw no guarantees 
for fair procedures and humanitarian treatment.
The Socialists also opposed the introduction of a new special legal order. 
In their view a special legal order for crisis situations caused by mass immi-
gration would not solve the migration crisis, but rather allow the government 
to use the military against civilian refugees or the Hungarian population 
and to curtail human rights.
The Socialist Party also expressed its doubts concerning the proposal 
that aimed at enabling the government to issue a list of safe third countries. 
The MSZP deputies believed that such a general list would not necessarily 
make the return of asylum seekers possible. The Socialist MPs pointed out that 
if a refugee could prove that he had come from a war zone or that he had not 
received the required protection in his way to Hungary, then the authorities 
would not have the right to send him back.
The MSZP had no reservation to the application of a quota in EU migra-
tion policy. Just like at the distribution of EU funds, applying a quota for sha-
ring the burdens of mass migration would be generally acceptable for the party. 
However, it did not agree with the actual quota regime proposed by the Jun-
ker-led European Commission, since the proposal did not include a cap on 
the number of asylum-seekers to be reallocated along those principles. Never-
theless, the party accepted – in the name of solidarity – the Council’s decision 
on the one-time relocation of asylum-seekers from Italy and Greece. The re-
presentative of the party expressed their preference for a complex solution 
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more funds for both the purchase of new technical equipment and the hiring 
of more personnel.
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The Socialist party did not support the deployment of physical border bar-
riers. It criticized the government for creating “a new iron curtain”. According 
to the Socialists, such national solutions could only result in further fences wi-
thin Europe and a fence at the Austrian-Hungarian border would be particular-
ly devastating given the daily border crossing by tens of thousands of Hunga-
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on the implementation of policies that would not undermine this achievement 
of the integration. The Socialists saw the decision on the border barrier not 
only as a sign of the government’s preference for national responses, but also as 
an evidence for its incompetence. They reminded that in the summer of 2015 
the government announced its decision to erect a fence and close the border 
by fall, but the sluggish implementation offered quite a lot of time for masses 
of migrants to reach the Hungarian border and cross it before the actual de-
ployment of the physical barrier. The MSZP, in principle, agreed to the creation 
of transit zones and to the idea of conducting assessment procedures at the bor-
der, but it did not support the government initiative as it saw no guarantees 
for fair procedures and humanitarian treatment.
The Socialists also opposed the introduction of a new special legal order. 
In their view a special legal order for crisis situations caused by mass immi-
gration would not solve the migration crisis, but rather allow the government 
to use the military against civilian refugees or the Hungarian population 
and to curtail human rights.
The Socialist Party also expressed its doubts concerning the proposal 
that aimed at enabling the government to issue a list of safe third countries. 
The MSZP deputies believed that such a general list would not necessarily 
make the return of asylum seekers possible. The Socialist MPs pointed out that 
if a refugee could prove that he had come from a war zone or that he had not 
received the required protection in his way to Hungary, then the authorities 
would not have the right to send him back.
The MSZP had no reservation to the application of a quota in EU migra-
tion policy. Just like at the distribution of EU funds, applying a quota for sha-
ring the burdens of mass migration would be generally acceptable for the party. 
However, it did not agree with the actual quota regime proposed by the Jun-
ker-led European Commission, since the proposal did not include a cap on 
the number of asylum-seekers to be reallocated along those principles. Never-
theless, the party accepted – in the name of solidarity – the Council’s decision 
on the one-time relocation of asylum-seekers from Italy and Greece. The re-
presentative of the party expressed their preference for a complex solution 
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formulated at EU level, which should also include the revision of the Dublin 
Regulation for it could not be implemented if countries were allowed to igno-
re without facing any sanctions. The Socialist deputies supported the one-time 
relocation, but did not find that mechanism suitable for long-term solutions. 
They argued that it was better to accept the already adopted Council decision 
on relocation and carry out the 1,294 asylum procedures than to take back 
more than 170 thousand migrants who had been first registered by Hungary.
For the very same reasons the Socialists were not willing to back the go-
vernment’s intention to take legal actions against the already agreed compul-
sory relocation decision. They also criticized the government for challenging 
a decision on the relocation of fewer than 1,300 people to Hungary, while tre-
ating the 2,700 (of whom 2,500 were Chinese) purchasers of residence bonds 
from the previous three years and their 4,700 (4,000 Chinese) family members 
much more generously by offering them a bureaucratic fast track of shorter de-
adlines and less administration. The Socialist MPs were critical of the privileged 
status of those immigrants who had enough money to pay for their admission. 
They blamed the government for operating “the cheapest way to come to Eu-
rope” since there was “no need to bring investments, hire Hungarian employ-
ees, produce added value, nor to stay in Hungary” – it was enough to lend mo-
ney to the Hungarian government for a few years which would then be paid 
back with interest on it. The Socialists claimed that it only benefited the rich 
foreigners and the private enterprises that were licensed to sell the government-
issued residence bonds. The real refugees, on the other hand, were not suppor-
ted properly; according to the Socialists, those who were in need and heavily 
dependent on assistance, could not rely on the Hungarian government, which 
curtailed their subsidies and eliminated the institutions of social inclusion ori-
ginally available for those under international protection.
The Socialist Party wanted to see parliament compel the government to seek 
EU-level solutions to the migration crisis. The Socialists criticized the prime mi-
nister and his cabinet for “doing everything to destroy the European Union” and 
saying no to everything at European level. In the vision of the Socialists, the EU 
will not fall apart, on the contrary, it will be stronger, and the government will 
only get Hungary become excluded from the cooperation of the core countries.
2.4.2.4. Other Parliamentary Parties
In the area of migration policy, the Democratic Coalition (DK), a splinter 
of the Hungarian Socialist Party, opposed every move of the government. It did 
not accept to put any blame on the Western powers or the European Union for 
the eruption of the migration crisis. Instead of giving national responses, the 
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DK only supported European policies for crisis management and called on the 
government to fulfil its international obligations. The party advised the MPs 
of the governing side to act like true Christians and follow the words of Pope 
Francis and accept the refugees. The DK found no legitimate reason for the ad-
option of a new special legal order. The deputies of the party did not agree with 
the physical border barriers and they also pointed out that the army was not 
trained for the task the government intended to use it at the borders.
The Politics Can Be Different (LMP), a party with a characteristic green 
and human rights advocacy profile, had initially taken a pro-European, huma-
nitarian policy line on migration. The representatives of the party emphasized 
Hungary’s peripheral location in the Schengen area and regarded the adoption 
of a joint European policy platform on migration as Hungary’s vital interest. 
They blamed the Hungarian foreign policy makers for the rushed recognition 
of Kosovo, the inviable country of the first wave of migrants reaching Hunga-
ry, and for not reckoning with the foreseeable consequences of the state collap-
se in Syria and Libya. The LMP also criticized the government for not respon-
ding the migration crisis in time: the initially given responses were rhetorical 
and propaganda-type; the giant poster campaign and the national consultation 
survey were wasting of time. While regarding the Commission’s quota propo-
sal inadequate and insane, the party condemned the Hungarian governmental 
reactions for not seeking a joint European response and for adding nothing to 
the solution of the crisis. The green deputies did not agree with the govern-
ment to reject the one-time relocation since it could be interpreted as if Hun-
gary would not be willing to support and participate in joint policies. In the 
lack of jointly formulated European policies Hungary, a transit country, would 
be in serious trouble if Germany wanted to send back those masses of migrants 
who had been registered at the Hungarian borders. The LMP representatives 
found the recognition rate of international protection claims in Hungary very 
low compared to the EU average. They supported the faster proceeding of asy-
lum claims, but insisted that the simplification of procedures should not re-
sult in inhuman or unfair treatment. They could accept the establishment of 
transit zones as well, but only on condition that the facilities for the refugees 
and their treatment were in line with Hungary’s international obligations. The 
party agreed the more severe punishment of human smugglers, but did not see 
any legitimate reason for the introduction of a new special legal order. Public 
work for refugees was in principle also acceptable for the party, though it re-
garded the actual situation as a considerable risk to immigrants because of the 
possibility of abusing their vulnerability. The LMP rejected any proposals de-
priving the refugees of their rights or subsidies. Their allowances should not be 
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compared to the subsidies of Hungarians, because the refugees were forced to 
leave their homeland. Moreover, seeing the government to argue against econo-
mic migrants, the greens called the government hypocritical for the facilitation 
of the settlement of residence bond buyers. Due to the involvement of offshore 
companies, the LMP calculated the total losses accounting for HUF 100 bn. 
In that light, the party was very critical of the steady cuts in the expenditures on 
integration policies and the decimation of funds allocated for international aid.
The green party expected the great powers to take responsibility for the con-
sequences of the wars they had started, but – in its view – both the EU and 
the USA needed to change the way they approached the crisis and the chaos at 
the borders. According to the LMP, the EU should strengthen its foreign policy 
institutions and contribute to the stabilization and consolidation of the crisis 
regions. More EU funds should be allocated to Europol, Frontex and Eurosur, 
while the Dublin regulation should be reassessed, the joint European foreign 
and security policy reconsidered. Immigration policy should be formulated 
at European level in cooperation with associated members like Serbia, Mace-
donia and Turkey, which are also needed for the successful implementation 
of joint policies. The LMP deputies wanted to see peacemaking and preven-
tion measures in the focus of European migration policy since the Euro-Atlan-
tic powers were only successful in the elimination of dictatorships in the Mid-
dle-East and in North Africa, and they failed to lay down the foundation 
of new and stable state organizations. The USA should provide more resources 
for the acceptance of refugees, but priority should be given to the addressing 
of the reasons of migration. The latter also demands the involvement of NATO 
as neither the internal power relations of the failed states, nor global economic 
interests facilitated peacemaking. Global economic imbalances and Western 
corporations’ interest in hiring cheap labor from African and Asian countries 
go against the successful management of migration. According to the LMP, first 
the political power should be restored in the failed states, then more interna-
tional aid should be given to those countries. The party also warned that clima-
te change would generate new waves of migration; the increasingly hostile we-
ather conditions would force nearly 200 million people to leave their homeland 
in the not so distant future.
Interestingly, the LMP was the only party to make a U-turn in its approach 
to migration. Not long after the Paris attacks the green party revised its earlier 
position:122 it admitted that this modern wave of migration was different from 
the earlier ones, therefore it required new policies since the classical response 
122 Http://mandiner.hu/cikk/20160222_felreertettuk_a_helyzetet_schiffer_andras_lmp_mandiner_
interju [accessed: 22.02.2016].
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– with the protection of human rights in its focus – was not applicable for such 
large-scale immigration. The Geneva Convention proved to be inappropriate 
for large crowds of immigrants, who were not all refugees, but also included 
a considerable share of economic migrants (as pursuers of better lifer) and an 
unknown number of fanatic members of terrorist organizations. In order to 
differentiate among them, the LMP wanted to see a new European mechanism 
that would filter effectively those entitled to international protection.
The Dialogue for Hungary (PM), a splinter from the LMP, expressed its 
support for the refugees and called on the government to meet the respective 
international obligations. In their MP’s view it was a mistake to label the im-
migrants as economic migrants as 90% of the asylum-seekers arrived from war 
zones. The party did not support the deployment of physical border barriers: it 
was skeptical about its usefulness and wanted to avoid spending HUF millions 
on the barriers. The representatives of the PM also opposed the idea of offering 
the refugees the possibility of public work as they were convinced that such 
a proposal would be followed by making this option mandatory. They deman-
ded the opening of new reception centers (to be created by the conversion 
of already existing barracks) and the hiring of more officers for the processing of 
asylum claims. Although the party agreed to the need of modifying the Dublin 
Regulation, it also warned the government not to blame the EU as the integra-
tion was not only about benefits but also about jointly shared burdens. Accor-
ding to the PM, the management of the migration crisis requires the formula-
tion of European level policies in which Hungary should participate actively.
The Hungarian Liberal Party (MLP) adopted a consistent, classic liberal 
position on migration. The MLP found the root of the crisis in radical Isla-
mist fundamentalism and the ISIS. The party played down the responsibility 
of both the EU and the USA, nevertheless it insisted that the tackling of the 
refuges crisis was a joint responsibility of the international community and 
that Hungary should seek and support international solutions instead of intro-
ducing policies unilaterally. The deputies of the MLP found the government 
unprepared for accepting a large number of asylum seekers and advocated to 
increase the capacities of the reception centers. In their view, since Hungary is 
a transit country, the government should only need to provide temporary care 
and shelters as well as increase the administrative capacities for asylum proce-
dures. Moreover, the government should also better inform and communicate 
with the refugees; that responsibility and job should not be left to volunteering 
NGOs. The liberals confronted the government with its own Migration Strate-
gy of 2013, which had advocated controlled economic migration to offset the 
decreasing population and the shortages of labor in certain sectors as well as 
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to contribute to both economic growth and the sustainability of the pension 
system, and criticized the governing Fidesz for talking and doing the complete 
opposite. They condemned the government for the anti-immigrant campaign 
which threatened the Hungarians by losing their jobs for the migrants. Accor-
ding to the MLP that was an unrealistic vision as the number of accepted refu-
gees was only a few hundreds. The party acknowledged the failure of EU migra-
tion policy, but warned the government about the deterioration of Hungary’s 
image by ignoring fundamental European values and not meeting international 
obligations. The liberals were not willing to give their consent to the allocation 
of further power to the government, since it had already abused its position and 
violated the principle of rule of law.
The MLP supported the introduction of a European quote system and re-
minded the government that of the HUF 4.1 bn spent on immigrants in 2015 
3.5 bn was covered from the EU budget. The representatives of the party de-
manded the lifting of rigid regulations (e.g. on family reunion) and wanted to 
see them more in line with “general humanitarian values”. The party rejected 
the building of physical border barriers and paraphrased the Pope by calling 
those who built fences to ask God for forgiveness.123 The MLP was also critical 
of the government’s decision on the list of the safe third countries. The libe-
ral MPs emphasized that in the lack of institutionalized protection the refuge-
es were in danger in Serbia. They quoted both the UNHCR and the Helsinki 
Committee on their negative conclusion on Serbia and claimed that the coun-
try would not become safe by merely a declaration of the Hungarian govern-
ment. The liberals worried about the security risks the residence bond scheme 
presented; given the low effectiveness of the Hungarian security services, they 
expressed their doubts concerning the reliability of the screening of every sin-
gle foreign citizen who had purchased such residence bonds. They demanded 
that the Hungarian government should support and contribute to the establi-
shment of a European security union. However, they also warned about the 
Hungarian foreign policy being too friendly towards Russia as it could hinder 
the smooth cooperation with Western security agencies.
2.4.3. The Quota Referendum
In 2015 Jobbik initiated a referendum on the rejection of the resettling and 
the return of foreign citizens to Hungary. However, the governing Fidesz regar-
ded the proposed question as in conflict with standing international treaties, 
123 Cf. https://news.vice.com/article/pope-francis-says-those-who-deny-migrants-should-ask-god-for- 
forgiveness [accessed: 18.06.2015].
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and did not support the initiative. Jobbik wanted to push for the modification 
of the constitution, but it failed to gain parliamentary backing for its intention. 
Moreover, their plan was soon overshadowed by the prime minister’s announ-
cement on holding a referendum on the possibility of the mandatory resettling 
of non-Hungarian citizens to Hungary without the consent of the Hungarian 
National Assembly. The referendum question was formulated in a way not to 
violate the already existing international treaties of Hungary124 and it was me-
ant to prevent the adoption of a quota-based mechanism for the mandatory 
resettlement of immigrants arriving to the EU. The governing parties rejected 
the Commission-sponsored proposal on the quota system and they were par-
ticularly critical of the lack of an upper cap on the possible number of immi-
grants incorporated into the resettlement scheme. They regarded the proposed 
mechanism as an invitation to further immigrants and portrayed the referen-
dum as the best means to protest against the inappropriate migration policy 
of the European Union. They also blamed the EU for its attempt to acquire 
new competences from the member states and punish heavily those unwilling 
to cooperate.125 In addition, the governing parties underlined the security and 
cultural risks of accepting illegal migrants.
Jobbik also took a position on the ‘no’ side. It rejected the mandatory qu-
ota, but did not see the need for a referendum any longer. Instead it wanted to 
modify the Fundamental Law and condition the resettlement of immigrants 
in Hungary to the consent of parliament. The representatives of the party cla-
imed that it would be easier and faster to modify the constitution than the hold 
a referendum. Taking this view on the referendum was followed by a rather re-
strained campaign of the party. As a few days before the end of the campaign 
the party leader, Gábor Vona had called on the prime minister to resign in case 
of an invalid referendum, circles within and close to the government suggested 
that Jobbik remained deliberately passive126 to reduce voter participation and 
thus decrease the probability of reaching a turnout that would fell short of the 
threshold for validity.
The parties on the left were divided in their responses and campaign strate-
gy. While the Hungarian Liberal Party called on its sympathizers to turn aga-
inst the Fidesz, be pro-European and vote yes to reject the anti-EU attitude and 
124 Altough the compliance of the referendum question with international treaties was challenged 
at the Constitution Court, the judges upheld the corresponding position of the National Election 
Committee and gave green light to the referendum.
125 The European Commission proposed to impose a solidarity contribution to be paid by each 
government that was unwilling to receive the migrants allocated by the quota to the corresponding 
country. The contribution was meant to be set at EUR 250,000 per untaken migrant.
126 See e.g. https://888.hu/article-a-jobbik-bojkottra-szolitotta-valasztoit [accessed: 30.10.2017].
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123 Cf. https://news.vice.com/article/pope-francis-says-those-who-deny-migrants-should-ask-god-for- 
forgiveness [accessed: 18.06.2015].
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and did not support the initiative. Jobbik wanted to push for the modification 
of the constitution, but it failed to gain parliamentary backing for its intention. 
Moreover, their plan was soon overshadowed by the prime minister’s announ-
cement on holding a referendum on the possibility of the mandatory resettling 
of non-Hungarian citizens to Hungary without the consent of the Hungarian 
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ticularly critical of the lack of an upper cap on the possible number of immi-
grants incorporated into the resettlement scheme. They regarded the proposed 
mechanism as an invitation to further immigrants and portrayed the referen-
dum as the best means to protest against the inappropriate migration policy 
of the European Union. They also blamed the EU for its attempt to acquire 
new competences from the member states and punish heavily those unwilling 
to cooperate.125 In addition, the governing parties underlined the security and 
cultural risks of accepting illegal migrants.
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ota, but did not see the need for a referendum any longer. Instead it wanted to 
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imed that it would be easier and faster to modify the constitution than the hold 
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strained campaign of the party. As a few days before the end of the campaign 
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124 Altough the compliance of the referendum question with international treaties was challenged 
at the Constitution Court, the judges upheld the corresponding position of the National Election 
Committee and gave green light to the referendum.
125 The European Commission proposed to impose a solidarity contribution to be paid by each 
government that was unwilling to receive the migrants allocated by the quota to the corresponding 
country. The contribution was meant to be set at EUR 250,000 per untaken migrant.
126 See e.g. https://888.hu/article-a-jobbik-bojkottra-szolitotta-valasztoit [accessed: 30.10.2017].
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policies of the government, the Democratic Coalition urged its supporters to 
boycott the referendum and thus reduce the turnout and the chance of valid 
vote. The Socialists were ready to take actions against a mandatory resettlement 
scheme, but they did not see a ground for the referendum as they did not expect 
such a quota mechanism to be put on the agenda of the European Union. 
The Socialist Party also criticized the referendum for being anti-European and 
xenophobic. The party did not have an explicit position on voting yes or no; 
instead it told its sympathizers to “stay at home that we could stay in Europe. 
The Dialogue for Hungary – along with two small liberal parties – stressed that 
the subjects of the proposed resettlement scheme were not immigrants, but re-
fuges. They campaigned with the message that those who did not vote, voted for 
the EU. The Politics Can Be Different party, on the other hand, refused to en-
gage into the referendum campaign and announced that it would not take side 
in the referendum. The leaders of the party declared their intention not to vote, 
but they also encouraged the LMP supporters to shape their own position freely.
The referendum was held on October 2, 2016. The proportion of the “no” 
answers in percentage of the valid votes was 1.64%, thus the share of the valid 
“yes” votes was 98.36%, while 6.17% of the participants cast an invalid vote.127 
However, since the turnout (44.08%) was not high enough to exceed the 50% 
validity threshold, the referendum was declared to be invalid.128 Neverthe-
less, the governing parties not only underlined the overwhelmingly proportion 
of the “no” votes, but also pointed out that more people (3.362 million) vo-
ted for the government-sponsored position this time than they did in the EU 
accession referendum (3.056 m)129. Jobbik, on the other hand, considered the 
referendum a failure and pressed all those responsible for drawing the consequ-
ences. Blaming the prime minister on the first place, the party demanded his 
resignation. At the same time Jobbik repeated its proposal to modify the con-
stitution. The Socialist Party condemned the government for its “misleading” 
and “hateful” campaign. The party leadership denied the “political validity” 
of the referendum, which they only regarded as an extremely expensive public 
opinion poll. In their view the abstention of the majority was not about apathy, 
it was a protest against the government: its hunger for power and its referen-
dum which was full of “anger and lies”. Given the invalidity of the referendum, 
127 The relatively high proportion of invalid votes can – at least to some extent –be explained by the 
campaign message of the Hungarian joke party (the “Two-tailed Dog Party”), which called its sympathizers 
to give the silly question a silly answer and vote invalidly. Having seen the high number of invalid votes, 
the leader of the party announced that they would run for seats in the 2018 parliamentary election.
128 See http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ref2016/1154/1154_0_index.html [accessed: 20.11.2016].
129 Http://www.valasztas.hu/nepszav03/outroot/hu/10_0.html [accessed: 20.11.2016].
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the Socialists announced that they would not support any government moves 
built around the “no” votes as they were unconstitutional. The Democratic Co-
alition viewed the low turnout its own success and called the invalidity of the 
referendum a long-awaited victory of the left and a major blow to the govern-
ment and the prime minister. The party leader emphasized that in a normal 
democratic environment the prime minister would step down after such a po-
litical failure. The LMP expected the government’s position in EU-level barga-
ining to weaken after the invalidity of the referendum. To use the referendum 
as a campaign tool, to overheat the debate and to turn the referendum question 
into an emotional issue was a major mistake of the government, which was 
harmful to the whole country. The Dialogue for Hungary and its small libe-
ral partners assessed the low turnout as the outcome of a success boycott stra-
tegy and the defeat of the “politics of hatred” forecasting the electoral failure 
of the “inhuman and heartless government” in the next elections. In their un-
derstanding the referendum was also a vote of no-confidence against the go-
vernment, therefore the prime minister would better resign. They protested 
against the “most expensive and deceitful propaganda campaign” of post-com-
munist Hungary and expressed their satisfaction with the government unable 
to turn the country into the land of fear and hatred.130
After the referendum, the prime minister announced that – in order to meet 
the political expectations of those who voted “no” in the referendum – the go-
vernment would initiate the modification of the Fundamental Law. The cor-
responding bill intended to add to the preamble that was a fundamental duty 
of the state to protect our national self-identity. The body text was meant to 
be modified to underline that the EU might not curtail the discretionary ri-
ghts of the Hungarian government for making decisions on such fundamental 
elements of national sovereignty as its territory, population and the structure 
of government; in other words: these competences should be reserved from EU 
influence. The government also wanted to codify that the protection of Hun-
gary’s constitutional identity is mandatory for every single state organs. Finally, 
the proposal included a ban on the compulsory settlement of aliens to Hunga-
ry as well as the requirement of a case-to-case approval of the residence permit 
of all foreign citizen from outside the European Economic Area.
Passing the modification of the constitution would have required the sup-
port of 2/3rd of all MPs. As the governing parties were short of the constitutio-
nal majority,131 they sought the support of the other parliamentary groups. The 
130 Http://www.szeretlekmagyarorszag.hu/az-elso-reakciok-az-ervenytelen-nepszavazasra/ 
[accessed: 20.11.2016].
131 In the election of 2014 Fidesz-KDNP obtained 133 seats, which is the threshold for the con- 
stitutional majority. However, after losing a by-election in February 2015 (https://veol.hu/hirek/vesz 
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parties of the left did not agree with the modification and decided not to pro-
vide the governing coalition the missing votes. Jobbik, on the other hand, dec-
lared its support for the proposal but only on condition that the government 
would put an end to the residence bond scheme. Since this demand remained 
unmet, the modification to the Fundamental Law did not obtain enough votes 
in parliament (November 8, 2016).
After the invalid referendum the failure to push the changes to the consti-
tution through parliament was interpreted by the opposition as a second ma-
jor defeat of the government. However, voting alone for the proposal on the 
modification of the Fundamental Law offered Fidesz the opportunity to por-
tray itself as the only party committed to the protection of Hungary from mass 
migration, which could generate addition support for Fidesz from those anti-
immigration voters, who originally voted for different parties.132
2.4.4. The Dynamics of Party Contest in the Area of Migration
The evolution of party responses to the migration crisis showed various pat-
terns and dynamics. On the government side, one could first witness a wait-
and-see period followed by an intensive rhetoric campaign, later by actual ac-
tions and a referendum. Fidesz was loyal to the government and its position on 
migration evolved accordingly from threat perception and simple rejection to 
the support of stricter and stricter anti-immigration measures and the promi-
se of national solutions to the crisis. What the party originally described as an 
economic challenge and danger to Hungarians was later discussed as a complex 
issue that had cultural, epidemic and security dimensions as well, and mass mi-
gration was soon presented as a major threat to the entire European civilization. 
Benefitting from its governing position, Fidesz MPs and cabinet members co-
uld dominate the political discourse and formulate policies free from domestic 
constraints. In line with the values of the bulk of the society, Fidesz adopted 
a fiercely anti-immigration profile and was not afraid to absorb proposals from 
other parties if they fitted into its policy line. The governing party took over, 
but presented and implemented as its own policies some of the proposals that 
had originally been put forward by Jobbik. Those included the deployment 
of more human forces to the borders, the use of the military to assist with bor-
der control, the detention of asylum-seekers, the expulsion of those dangero-
premi-idokozi-valasztas-1680827 [accessed: 23.02.2016]), they needed external support to have enough 
votes for a change to the constitution.
132 The “no” in the referendum was actually supported by 1.1 million more people than the Fidesz-
KDNP party list in the 2014 parliamentary elections (http://www.valasztas.hu/hu/ogyv2014/861/861_0_
index.html [accessed 20.11.2016]).
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us to public safety, the referendum on mandatory resettlement, and initiating 
a corresponding modification to the Fundamental Law. The view of “not all 
migrants are terrorists, but all terrorists are migrants” was also first expressed by 
Jobbik and then paraphrased by Fidesz. Once the governing party also borro-
wed from the left: the modification of the penal code to impose more severe pe-
nalties on human smugglers had originally been initiated by the Socialists, but 
at that time it had been rejected by Fidesz; later the governing majority passed 
a reformulated and expanded bill that – among other provisions – also inclu-
ded the stricter punishment of human smugglers.
In West European countries the anti-immigration position has usually been 
occupied by right-wing radical parties, which tend to be xenophobic and an-
ti-Muslim in their platform.133 Although Jobbik also emerged as a radical ri-
ght-wing party, in lack of any significant immigration from non-European co-
untries to Hungary, its racist views targeted not the immigrants, but the local 
Roma and the Jewish communities.134 Jobbik was also atypical in the camp 
of radical right-wing parties for the openly pro-Arab and pro-Islamist state-
ments of its president.135 Therefore, turning against migration and rejecting 
immigrants arriving in great numbers from Arabic countries required a chan-
ge in the course of the party’s rhetoric. While this reorientation went relative-
ly smoothly, the implementation of some Jobbik proposals by the government 
was not taken so easily and the party could not respond it consistently: once 
it took with criticism (e.g. strict border control), to support it later; at another 
occasion it was just the other way around (e.g. quota referendum and consti-
tutional changes); yet another time it welcomed (e.g. the military involvement 
in border control), while demanding more (competences for the army). Jobbik 
was initially more radical with its proposal than the governing Fidesz, but when 
the government started to make its own actions, Fidesz was able to overtake the 
radicals, and seized not only the momentum, but also the long-term political 
control over the agenda of migration.
The parties on the left mostly responded to the migration crisis by the co-
nventional humanitarian arguments, and they all awaited for EU-level respon-
ses and solutions to the crisis. However, as the European institutions were too 
sluggish in the formulation of joint responses and the crisis management by 
the EU proved to be ineffective, the parties on the left could not increase their 
popular support during the migration crisis; in fact, their popularity either 
133 Nemzet és radikalizmus. Egy új pártcsalád felemelkedése, ed. A. Lánczi, Budapest 2011, p. 18.
134 Ibidem, pp. 254–255.
135 E.g. http://www.moroccoworldnews.com/2013/11/111456/hungary-far-right-party-leader-says-is 
lam-is-the-last-hope-of-humanity/ [accessed: 22.02.2017]; http://www.jobbik.com/vona_g%C3%A1bor_
about_islam [accessed: 22.02.2017].
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decreased or did not change. The only party which decided to modify its pure-
ly humanitarian platform was the Politics Can Be Different. The LMP adjusted 
its course in response to the terrorist attacks in Paris, and acknowledged the se-
curitization of the migration issue, while also insisting on the rights of asylum-
seekers to humanitarian treatment and fair assessment procedures. However, 
the change of course made no considerably impact on the level of public 
support for the party (Figure 2.5).
Figure 2.5
Changes in Party Preferences between 2014–2016 
Source: http://kozvelemenykutatok.hu/partpreferencia/ [accessed: 8.02.2017].
Of all polling agencies Ipsos (from 2016: Závecz Research Institute) and 
Nézőpont Institute were the ones that carried out most regularly their surveys 
during the period of 2014–2016. The party preferences recorded by both pol-
lsters showed similar trends. The popularity of Fidesz, the winner of the 2014 
parliamentary election, decreased slowly until the middle/end of the summer 
of 2015. At the same time, Jobbik, the right wing opposition of the govern-
ment, was able to capitalize from the realignment of the electorate and sta-
bilized it popularity at a higher level. However, with the number of irregu-
lar immigrants peaking, the closing gap between Fidesz and Jobbik started to 
grow again. Fidesz was able to regain some of its previously lost support, whi-
le Jobbik fell back in popularity. Public support for Fidesz reached a local ma-
ximum at the time of the quota referendum, but the subsequent decrease was 
not coupled by a considerable change in the popularity of its main challenger, 
Jobbik. The parties on the left witnessed smaller changes in their public support, 
therefore the overall characteristics of the party system remained the same 
as they were in 2014.
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Figure 2.6
Changes in Party Preferences between 2014–2016 (Nézőpont Institute)
Source: http://kozvelemenykutatok.hu/partpreferencia/ [accessed: 8.02.2017].
2.5. Conclusions 
(Sándor Gallai)
The large influx of irregular immigrants to the European Union via the We-
stern Balkan route put a very severe burden on the Hungarian authorities. The 
country was generally regarded as a transit country for immigrants – typically 
seeking a better life in Austria, Germany, the Nordic or the Benelux countries. 
Very few arrived at the official border crossing points; the bulk of the migrants 
chose the green border instead. When caught at border crossing, the irregu-
lar migrants submitted their request for international protection, but usually 
did not wait for a decision to be made on their claim, but left for Western Eu-
rope instead. Partly in fear of a potentially high number of Schengen returns 
and also in recognition of the security risks presented by irregular migration, 
the government diverted the flow of migration and restricted the number of 
those who could enter the territory of Hungary. The primary means for that 
was the installation of physical border barriers, the criminalization of both il-
legal border crossing and the damaging of the barriers, and the establishment 
of transit zones in which a daily cap on the number newcomers was introduced. 
The capacities in the reception centers were reduced, while human resources at 
the borders were expanded. The policy of artificial bottlenecks was accompanied 
by the curtailing of the entitlements of those under international protection.
The main policies of the government provoked fierce criticism from EU and 
the Council of Europe institutions, Western governments and international 
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le Jobbik fell back in popularity. Public support for Fidesz reached a local ma-
ximum at the time of the quota referendum, but the subsequent decrease was 
not coupled by a considerable change in the popularity of its main challenger, 
Jobbik. The parties on the left witnessed smaller changes in their public support, 
therefore the overall characteristics of the party system remained the same 
as they were in 2014.
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Figure 2.6
Changes in Party Preferences between 2014–2016 (Nézőpont Institute)
Source: http://kozvelemenykutatok.hu/partpreferencia/ [accessed: 8.02.2017].
2.5. Conclusions 
(Sándor Gallai)
The large influx of irregular immigrants to the European Union via the We-
stern Balkan route put a very severe burden on the Hungarian authorities. The 
country was generally regarded as a transit country for immigrants – typically 
seeking a better life in Austria, Germany, the Nordic or the Benelux countries. 
Very few arrived at the official border crossing points; the bulk of the migrants 
chose the green border instead. When caught at border crossing, the irregu-
lar migrants submitted their request for international protection, but usually 
did not wait for a decision to be made on their claim, but left for Western Eu-
rope instead. Partly in fear of a potentially high number of Schengen returns 
and also in recognition of the security risks presented by irregular migration, 
the government diverted the flow of migration and restricted the number of 
those who could enter the territory of Hungary. The primary means for that 
was the installation of physical border barriers, the criminalization of both il-
legal border crossing and the damaging of the barriers, and the establishment 
of transit zones in which a daily cap on the number newcomers was introduced. 
The capacities in the reception centers were reduced, while human resources at 
the borders were expanded. The policy of artificial bottlenecks was accompanied 
by the curtailing of the entitlements of those under international protection.
The main policies of the government provoked fierce criticism from EU and 
the Council of Europe institutions, Western governments and international 
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organizations. Nevetheless, they contributed to a more effective border control 
and a major drop in the number of arriving immigrants. As those measures also 
enjoy broad public support in Hungary, they helped the governing Fidesz par-
ty increase its popularity. The leftist parties tended to stuck into the conventio-
nal humanist position and proved to be unable to change their platform and 
rhetoric after the terrorist attacks in Western Europe. The strongest challen-
ge could have been presented by Jobbik, the party of extreme right. However, 
benefitting from both the governmental position and the wider media reach 
out, Fidesz could keep the agenda under control, absorbed some of the policy 
ideas of Jobbik and presented them as own proposals fitting well into its consi-
stently rigid anti-immigration and pro-soveregnity policy line.
In addition, the migration crisis brought the Visegrad countries closer to 
each other and made them capable to formulate joint platforms and re-easta-
blish a closer cooperation than in the previous years. Nevertheless, the govern-
ment will continue to face legal and political disputes both at international and 
EU level, but it is important to stress that those conflicts seem to make Fidesz 
supporters more committed and determined, which can serve the party as a va-
luable political asset ahead of next year’s elections.
Compared to the other Visegrad countries, Hungary was definitely the most 
affected by mass migration, which resulted in a relatively significant proportion 
of people gaining personal experience of immigrants. As opposed to general 
expectations, this did no translate into higher support for immigrants and refu-
gees; on the contrary, the overwhelming majority of those with personal expe-
rience had rather negative views on the migrants. Therefore, the government-
driven anti-migration campaigns only reinforced already existing reservations 
and hostility towards immigrants of markedly distinct cultural background. 
While both the government and the general public assess EU responses to the 
migration crisis rather negatively, they would like to see a more active role of 
the EU in finding an effective solution to the crisis. The majority view of Hun-
garians is in line with the policies of the government: they would prefer to take 
actions outside the terrtitory of the European Union and invest heavily into 
international cooperation and aid targeting the crisis zones in hope of giving 
them peace and stability.
Anna Kobierecka, Michał Kobierecki,
Robert Łoś, Michał Rulski
Chapter 3
Migration as a Political and Public Phenomenon: 
The Case of Poland
